

**Another Great Illusion:
The Advancement of Separatism through Economic Integration***

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Abstract

Economic integration is widely argued to increase subnational demands for independence. Yet, increasingly high degrees of integration have not been associated with a commensurate explosion of separatist activity. Integration, I argue, should not promote separatism because states retain important political and economic powers even in the face of major integration, and because separatist movements intrinsically support strong states, albeit not the ones from which they are seeking independence. Empirically, I test this argument through the case of post-WWII European integration, a hard test of my argument, since the European Union (EU) is the most advanced economic integration scheme in the world today. The quantitative analysis supports this argument showing that EU integration is weakly associated with a minor increase in separatist party activity in only two countries, Belgium and the United Kingdom. Further qualitative analysis suggests that even in these two countries the increase in separatist activity is not due to integration.

The end of World War II triggered an explosion in foreign trade and investment. This flurry of economic activity has often been linked to the emergence of new separatist movements around the world and the reinvigoration of quiescent ones. The Zapatista uprising in Mexico and the renewed momentum of the Québécois in Canada have both been attributed to the signing of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) (Fox 1994; Rich 1997; Conklin 1996). The eagerness of the former republics of Yugoslavia to declare independence has likewise been linked to the willingness of the European Union to open its doors to these states upon independence (Crawford 1996). Even the illicit drug trade in the South Caucasus, and the legal oil trade in the Sudan, have been associated with separatist activity in these countries (Woods 2003; Peuch 2004).

Economic integration is believed to advance separatist movements like these by eliminating the need for regions to belong to large states in order to have access to large free-trade zones (Alesina and Spolaore 1997; Paelinck and Polèse 1999; Dardelli 2002; Marks and Wilson 2000; Tosutti 2002; Sorens 2005; Jolly 2006). The effect is reportedly the strongest among economically advanced regions that are well-positioned to capitalize on foreign trade and investment and to sustain themselves as independent states. Integration that occurs through international organizations, like the European Union (EU), is supposed to spur separatist movements even further by weakening the political and economic authority of national governments and facilitating cooperation among separatist groups (Lynch 1996; Jeffery 1997; Dardelli 2002; de Winter and Gomez-Reino Cachafeiro 2002; Gupta 2002).

If true, the implications are far-reaching. According to the World Trade Organization (WTO), foreign trade has grown in volume more than twenty-seven times since 1950.¹ In this year, foreign trade only made up 6 percent of the world's GDP. In 2006, it made up 21 percent. A major factor behind this growth is the rise of new international trade

¹http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/envir_e/climate_impact_e.htm.

organizations, such as NAFTA, the Common Market of the South (MERCOSUR) and the Eurasian Economic Community (EAEC), and the expansion of old ones, like the EU and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Today, one-third of the world's trade takes place within regional trade blocs (OECD 2001).

Even though the world has become increasingly more integrated, there has not been a commensurate explosion of separatist activity around the globe. In fact, by some measures, violent separatist activity has declined globally since the 1990s (Hewitt, Wilkenfeld and Gurr 2008). Successful military operations that have suppressed long-running separatist movements, like those in Sri Lanka and Russia, have contributed significantly to this decline, as have negotiated settlements, that have ended other conflicts peacefully, like those in Indonesia. Still other separatist movements, including the one spearheaded by the Northern League in Italy, have simply faded away as leaders have relinquished their demands for independence or have been reluctant to extend their demands beyond regional autonomy.

In this study, I challenge both theoretically and empirically the widely held view that economic integration advances separatism even within international trade organizations where the effect of integration is likely to be the greatest. Only a few scholars have thus far challenged this view on theoretical grounds, arguing that integration does not necessarily promote separatism because other factors coincide with or offset the effect of the former on the latter (Sambanis 2006; Zinn 2006). Zinn (2006) argues, for example that economic integration and separatism are not causally linked but form two parallel trends. Sambanis (2006) argues that integration encourages separatism, but not when it is not offset by fiscal and political decentralization. In addition to these studies, a number of qualitative case studies have shown that the attitudes of particular separatist parties toward economic integration are complex and not always supportive of integration (Murray and Tonge 2005; McGarry and Keating 2006; Dardanelli 2010).

Building on these works, I argue that economic integration is unlikely to promote separatism because states retain important political and economic powers even in the face of major economic integration, and because separatist movements by their nature support strong states, although obviously not the states from which they are trying to secede but those that they aspire to form. To test my argument, I analyze quantitatively the effect of economic integration on separatism in post-WWII Europe. Europe is a hard test of my argument since the European Union is the most advanced economic integration scheme in the world today and the focus of much of the debate on integration and separatism.² If integration increases demands for separatism anywhere, it should do so in Europe. Although the analysis is focused on Europe, it has implications beyond the continent since economic integration has increased in other regions of the world, and a significant part of this integration has taken place within regional trade blocs.

The Illusion of Separatism through Integration

Economic integration is commonly argued to advance demands for autonomy and independence by reducing the value of large states (Alesina and Spolaore 1997; Alesina and Spolare 2003; Paelinck and Polèse 1999; Dardelli 2002; Marks and Wilson 2000). In the absence of integration, large states provide a sizable area over which regions can exchange products and services without trade barriers. Thus, in removing these barriers, economic integration reduces the need for regions to belong to large states in order to participate in large free-trade zones. The impact of integration is arguably the greatest among economically advanced regions that benefit the most from international trade and investment and are most likely to be able sustain themselves as independent states (Paelinck and Polèse 1999).

²In 2007, 74% of trade by European countries occurred with other European countries (World Trade Organization 2008).

The notion that separatism varies depending on the ability of regions to sustain themselves as independent states is consistent with arguments about the effects of natural resources, such as oil and diamonds, on separatism. These arguments claim that resource-rich regions are more likely to demand independence than resource-poor regions because they can trade their resources internationally to sustain themselves economically as sovereign states (Ross 2004).

Integration schemes, like the ASEAN, the EU, and MERCOSUR, are believed to further bolster demands for autonomy and independence by reducing the political and economic authority of national governments (Lynch 1996; Jeffery 1997). These organizations can limit the autonomy of national governments by requiring member states to meet certain financial standards in order to join, as in the case of the International Monetary Fund, or by transferring legislative authority to international organizations on particular issues. The EU has more authority over the political and economic affairs of its member states than any other trade organization. Besides trade, the EU's economic authorities include, currency, commerce, agriculture, and fisheries, among others. Its political powers are more limited and intended to safeguard the common values and fundamental interests of member states, protect the independence and integrity of the Union, and preserve and promote democracy, human rights and the rule of law.

The European Union has further eroded the authority of national governments in a way that encourages separatism, scholars argue, by giving subnational regions direct access to and representation within the European Union (de Winter and Gomez-Reino Cachafeiro 2002; Gupta 2002; Laible 2002; Lynch 1996). Regions can participate directly in the Union through the Committee of Regions, which the European Commission and European Council must consult with on proposals related to the regional and local governments. Regions can also sit on committees in the European Commission and the European Council and participate

in the Council if states delegate their Council vote to them. They can also directly lobby the European Union on issues of concern to them.

Granting regions direct access to the European Union has advanced demands for independence, scholars argue, by allowing separatist parties from other countries to interact with each other in different bodies within the EU and in the European Free Alliance (EFA) in particular (Marks and McAdam 1996; Lynch 1996; de Winter and Gomez-Reino Cachafeiro 2002). The EFA is a European political party comprised of regional parties from the individual member states. These interactions are supposed to advance separatist parties in their home states by providing parties with logistical and administrative support, assistance in developing party programs and organizational structures, enhanced political status and prestige, and even a boost in their morale. Given the strength of the European Union along all of these dimensions, Europe should be more likely than any other region in the world to experience a rise in separatist activity as a result of economic integration.

Challenging the Separatist Illusion

Nonetheless, economic integration, I argue, should not increase separatism because national governments retain important political and economic powers even in the face of significant integration, and because separatist movements intrinsically support strong states albeit not the ones from which they are seeking independence. Integration that occurs through bilateral trade does not reduce the authority of states because it does not involve a transfer of authority to either the subnational or supranational level of government. Trade, in general, is supposed to strengthen the former by making regions' threats to secede more credible and leading governments to grant regions autonomy in order to stave off these threats (Alesina and Spolaore 1997; Sambanis 2006). However, as explained further below, economic integration does not make independence a more credible threat for most regions and is not likely to

elicit such a response as a result. Moreover, as Garrett and Rodden (2003) argue, integration can strengthen the authority of national governments because regions, which are differentially affected by shocks in the world economy, including economically advanced regions, are likely to want strong national governments to help offset the costs of these shocks.

Integration that occurs through international organizations does not reduce the authority of states by much either, even though it does involve a transfer of authority to a supranational level of government. With the exception of the European Union, most international trade organizations, including ASEAN and MERCOSUR, entail little, if any, transfer of power to the supranational level. In fact, many organizations, like ASEAN, have an explicit policy of non-interference in the internal affairs of their member states. Even within the European Union, which involves the largest transfer of authority to the subnational level of government, national governments retain important political powers. They are still the major engines of foreign policy and defense in the European Union, and still maintain significant authority over economic decisions regarding redistribution as well as macro-economic and fiscal policy.

Granting regions direct access to the EU does not curtail the authority of national governments by much either. While regions have direct access to certain institutions within the EU, like the Committee of Regions, they do not have direct access to key institutions, like the European Court of Justice. The Committee of Regions is merely a consultative body with no decision-making authorities. Regions are also not well-represented in the institutions for which they do have direct access. They do not participate very often in committees on the European Commission or Council and no region has ever assumed a state's vote on the European Council. Many separatist parties, like the Basque National Party in Spain and the Northern League in Italy, also do not belong to the EFA or the Committee of Regions. Some have been banned from the EFA because they are violent while others have chosen to join other European parties. It is also not clear how interactions between separatist parties

within the European Union will necessarily yield increased support at home.

International trade organizations do not generally strengthen the authority of subnational governments either. No international organization, with the recent exception of the European Union, requires states to decentralize in order to become members. The EU has only required recent applicants to have regional administrative structures in place before joining to facilitate the management of the Union's Structural Funds. The Funds are aimed at reducing economic disparities among regions. However, the European Union does not specify what these regional structures must entail. Thus, in practice, they tend to have little authority and are unlikely, therefore, to offset demands for independence. The EU policy on minorities has not helped strengthen regional autonomy or protect minority rights either because the policy is ambiguous and not well monitored or enforced (Sasse 2006).

Not only do states retain important political and economic powers in the face of economic integration, but separatist regions cannot expect to join these organizations if they declare independence. International law requires separatist regions meet an organization's accession requirements in order to join an organization even if the state that they are seceding from already belongs to the organization. Meeting these requirements may be very difficult for separatist regions to do since accession requirements can be stringent and separatist regions are likely to be much weaker politically and economically than the states from which they secede.

The EU maintains more stringent accession requirements than other any international organization. In order to join the EU, countries must have robust democracies and functioning market economies. They must also adhere to the aims of the political, economic and monetary union and adopt the *acquis communautaire*, which represents the common rights and obligations of all member states in the Union. The *acquis communautaire* includes all the treaties, regulations and directives of the European Union and all judgements issued by

the Court of Justice. As a result, the accession process is often very long and usually entails significant political and economic reforms.

Even if separatist regions are capable of meeting these accession requirements, international organizations are unlikely to throw open their doors to separatist regions. States are likely to block the accession of these regions if they are already members of these organizations, and are most likely to be effective in this regard if every member state must approve an acceding state's application, as is the case in ASEAN, MERCOSUR and the European Union. Slovenia did not face this challenge joining the European Union because Serbia was not a member of the European Union in 2004 when it acceded and is still not a member.

Members of international organizations that face their own separatist movements are also unlikely to recognize separatist regions in this way to avoid encouraging regions in their own countries to declare independence. Spain, for example, facing its own separatist movements in the Basque Country and Catalonia, has explicitly refused to recognize Kosovo as an independent state unless Serbia recognizes it, or unless the United Nations passes a resolution to this effect. Even countries that do not face their own separatist movements may be reluctant to jeopardize their relationships with other states by recognizing separatist regions.

In practice, many international organizations have gone so far as to publicly support member states in opposition to separatist movements within their borders. In 1995, the year Quebec held a referendum to decide its independence, Mexico sided with the Canadian government, its partner in NAFTA. In 2009, when separatists from the Santa Cruz region of Bolivia declared independence in a referendum, the Organization of American States (OAS), the Bolivarian Alternative for the Americas (ALBA), and the Rio Group outwardly opposed the referendum. Earlier, in 2000, members of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization signed a pact to enhance cooperation among member states to combat separatism, extremism and

terrorism in Asia. Similarly, ASEAN, whose Charter declares the need to uphold the territorial integrity of its member states and pledges non-interference in their internal affairs, has supported Indonesia in its opposition to Aceh separatism. It has also excluded Taiwan from the organization in which China is a member.

Not only do states retain important economic and political powers but separatist movements have an intrinsic interest in states remaining strong because they value autonomy. To preserve their autonomy, some separatist movements forswear memberships in international organizations. Sinn Fein, for example, does not want Northern Ireland to belong to NATO so that it can determine its own foreign policy emphasizing peaceful means to conflict resolution and global justice. Until 1999, Sinn Fein also rejected membership in the European Union. In Bosnia-Herzegovina, separatist parties representing ethnic Serbs in the country rejected the European Union following the Dayton Peace Agreement (1995). Seeking to avoid further involvement of Western Europe in their state, they advocated instead a loosely configured, pan-Serb union with the former Yugoslavia. In still other countries, like Sri Lanka, separatist movements have simply remained silent on the issue of integration.

Some separatist movements, in contrast, want to participate in international organizations but are resistant to major, and sometimes even minor, restrictions of their autonomy resulting from membership. For this reason, they often frame criticisms of particular policies established by these organizations as an infringement of their sovereignty. In other words, separatist parties often represent policies harmful to their regions as a reason for the regions to determine the policies themselves. It is very difficult, as a result, for these movements to effectively use international organizations to mobilize support for independence. The Northern League has faced this challenge in Italy. While it supports Italy's membership in the European Union, it also has campaigned for Italy's withdrawal from the currency union because the euro, it argues, has contributed to the country's high inflation and reduced the

competitiveness of its industries located primarily in the North.

In sum, economic integration is most likely to increase separatism in Europe due to the large volume of trade among European countries and the strength of the European Union. Within the European Union, the effect should be the strongest among economically advanced regions that benefit the most from integration and are most likely to meet the membership requirements of international organizations upon independence. However, even in Europe, I argue, economic integration is unlikely to increase separatism because states retain significant political and economic power in the face of integration, and because separatist movements intrinsically desire strong states, albeit not the states from which they are seeking independence but those they seek to establish in the future.

Methodology

To evaluate the effect of integration on separatism, I conduct a large-N statistical analysis of the relationship between European integration and the electoral strength of separatist parties. The predominant view that integration advances separatism is driven in part, I argue, by the methodology chosen to address this question. Formal models, for example, in focusing on the economic benefits of free trade in general do not take into account other factors that impinge on the effect of free trade in practice, like opposition to integration due to concerns over sovereignty (Alesina and Spolaore 1997; Alesina and Spolare 2003; Paelinck and Polèse 1999). Qualitative case studies, meanwhile, in examining particular countries, where integration seems to have spurred separatism, like Belgium and the United Kingdom, have reached conclusions about the effects of integration that are not necessarily representative of other countries (Dardelli 2002; de Winter and Gomez-Reino Cachafeiro 2002; Gupta 2002; Laible 2002; Lynch 1996). The statistical analysis herein takes these factors into count in order to reason generalizable conclusions about the effect of integration

in a large number of countries over time.

The analysis examines the effect of economic integration on separatism in 35 Western and Eastern Europe between 1945 and 2008. These countries are as follows: Albania, Austria, Belgium, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Czechoslovakia, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Moldova, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and West Germany. In focusing on Europe, the most integrated region of the world, this analysis establishes an upper bound regarding the intensifying effect of economic integration on separatism. I expect this upper bound to be zero. Failing to uncover null effects like this can lead to distorted conclusions about effect size, which are especially pronounced in quantitative analyses with small sample sizes (Gerber, Green and Nickerson 2001).

Data and Measures

I use the following data and measures in this analysis to evaluate the effect of post-WWII economic integration on European separatism.

Economic Integration

I measure economic integration in the analysis in two ways. The first is in terms of *European Union (EU) integration*. I represent EU integration with an ordinal measure identifying four major advances in integration that have taken place in Europe over the post-World War II period. These advances involve the creation of the following four organizations: (1) European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), (2) European Economic Community (EEC), (3) European Union (EU), and (4) European Monetary Union (EMU). For a given election, ECSC members (1952-1956) are coded 1, EEC members (1957-1991) are coded 2, EU

members (1992-2008) are coded 3, and EMU members (1999-2008) are coded 4. Countries, like Switzerland and Albania, which are not members of any organization in this period are coded 0.

Each of these institutions significantly increased the level of integration in Europe. The ECSC established a common market for coal and steel, lifted restrictions on imports and exports and created a unified labor market. The EEC enlarged the common market beyond coal and steel, created a customs union, and established common policies in areas such as agriculture and trade. The EU expanded the scope of integration to include among other things, foreign policy and security as well as police and justice in respect to criminal matters. Finally, the EMU established a common currency within the European Union.

While the EU has become more integrated between these pivotal events, I do not try to capture this variation for a number of reasons. First, I measure separatism in terms of the strength of separatist parties. Separatist parties did not play any role in the evolution of the European Union at these four major junctures, but have arguably played a minor role in smaller changes in EU integration between them. Thus, in measuring integration in this way, I eliminate concerns over endogeneity. Second, small changes in integration are unlikely to change the appeals of separatist parties to voters, and are unlikely to change the voters' receptivity to these appeals as well.

The second way in which I measure economic integration is in terms of international trade and foreign direct investment using the *World Development Indicators* (1960-2010). I measure international trade in terms of total imports and exports of goods and services (% of gross domestic product (GDP)). I measure FDI in terms of total inflows (% of GDP) and total outflows (% of GDP). These measures address the fact that all economic activity does not take place within the European Union and that the level of economic integration varies within the European Union across member states between these major junctures.

Separatism

I measure separatist sentiment in the analysis in terms of the electoral strength of separatist parties. I define separatist parties as parties that demand the complete independence of a subnational territory of a state from that state, regardless of whether they support it joining another state or forming its own independent state (de Winter and Türsan 1998, 207).³ I do not identify parties as separatist parties if they do not advocate independence in the immediate term, but at some undefined point in the future, as in the case of the Basque Nationalist Party in Spain or the Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP) in Northern Ireland, because they do not actively advocate independence in the election period examined. To identify separatist parties, I draw on primary and secondary resources, including party platforms, party websites, newspaper articles, and academic articles and books. Appendix A includes a list of all separatist parties included in the analysis.

The electoral strength of separatist parties is a good, but imperfect, proxy for separatism. Not everyone who supports independence may participate in elections and not all support for separatist parties can be interpreted as support for independence, because people can vote for separatist parties for reasons other than their position on independence. However, most separatist sentiment in Europe is expressed peacefully through the political system and only a few violent separatist parties, such as Spain's Batasuna party, have been barred from electoral competition in the post-WWII period. Moreover, while separatist party strength may not fully represent the overall strength of separatism within countries, the statistical

³A number of other quantitative studies of integration have used electoral support to represent separatist sentiment, but these studies group support for independence-seeking parties together with other types of parties, including ethnic, religious and regional parties, that do not necessarily advocate independence. Tosutti (2002), for example, measures separatist sentiment in terms of ethnic, religious and regional parties combined. Jolly (2006) looks at the electoral strength of regional parties, which includes but is not limited to separatist parties, while Sorens (2005) analyzes so-called secessionist parties, among which he includes parties that advocate independence and those that only agitate for autonomy. Both Jolly (2006) and Sorens (2005) find that economic integration increases support for these parties while Tosutti (2002) finds mixed results.

analysis herein examines changes in the level of separatist sentiment within countries over time, not the overall strength, and should not be biased by these issues as a result.⁴

I measure the electoral strength of separatist parties in this study in terms of the percentage of votes that separatist parties win in national legislative (lower house) elections.⁵ This analysis is limited to only parties that win seats because there is too little information available on minor parties to reliably code them. Separatist parties sometimes participate in pre-election coalitions with non-separatist parties so that it is impossible to identify their vote count precisely. To address this issue, I create another measure that attributes the entire vote for the coalition to the separatist party. This variable, combined with the previous one, represents the maximum possible vote for separatist parties in a country. The vote for separatist parties that compete in coalitions with other separatist parties are included in the original measure.

Separatist parties have won votes in only 9 of the 35 countries included in the analysis: Bosnia-Herzegovina, Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Moldova, Spain, the United Kingdom and West Germany. The vote for separatist parties is significantly higher under each level integration in only 2 of these 9 countries: Belgium and the United Kingdom. In Belgium, separatist parties won 2.5% of the vote under the EEC, 7.8% under the EU, and 11% under the EMU. In the UK, they won 1% of the vote under the EEC and 3% under the EU, and less than 1% of the vote when the UK was not a member of any integration scheme in

⁴Unfortunately, public opinion surveys, which provide direct measures of separatist sentiment, do not exist for very many countries in Europe over the World War II period. Alternative measures used in other studies, such as the number of separatist movements in countries or the level of violence in countries, do not capture well the level of support for separatism in countries, unlike the vote count, because separatist movements can be fractionalized and not well supported within society (Zinn 2006). Fractionalization may even be indicative of weakness in the movement, so that higher fractionalization is correlated with lower levels of movement strength.

⁵I include only lower house elections in the analysis since all not countries in the dataset have upper houses. The election data is taken from the Constituency-Level Elections (CLE) dataset.(Brancati 2007). I only include democracies in the analysis because separatist parties cannot meaningfully compete in non-democracies. I consider democracies to be countries scoring 5 or higher on the Polity Index.

Europe. In France and West Germany, the vote for separatist parties is lower under higher degrees of integration and in Germany, Italy and Spain, it is higher in some cases and lower in others. Bosnia-Herzegovina and Moldova are not members of the European Union or any of its predecessors.

In addition to measuring the overall electoral strength of separatist parties, I distinguish among parties in terms of their political ideologies and strategies, as well as the types of regions they represent. In this regard, I differentiate among parties that represent rich regions well-positioned to take advantage of economic integration and poor regions that are not. Rich regions should be more supportive of EU integration and more likely to benefit from it than poor regions as a result. I code parties as 1 for *rich* if they represent regions that have GDP per capita above their national average, and 0 otherwise.⁶

I also differentiate among parties in terms of their ideological positions on economic issues and their attitudes towards membership in the European Union. Right-wing parties tend to favor free trade and reduced state subsidies more than left-wing parties and should be more favorable toward economic integration and more likely to benefit electorally from it than left-wing parties as a result (Marks et al. 2006; Vachudova and Hooghe 2009). I code separatist parties as 1 for *right* if parties favor reduced taxes, decreased government spending, and a smaller welfare state, and 0 otherwise.

Parties' positions towards membership in the European Union are structured by issues besides economic ones, including issues of sovereignty and cultural assimilation. For this reason, I also identify the position of separatist parties on the EU directly. Parties that support membership in the EU should be more likely to use the EU to increase their support

⁶Unfortunately, it is not possible to measure the socio-economic characteristics of regions more precisely than this. The only existing regional economic data, which is available from the European Union, only covers countries that are members or applicant countries of the European Union for the period 1996-2006. As a result, the data does not capture important variation within Europe, namely non-member states of the European Union and the pre-Maastricht period when integration was more limited.

among the electorate than those that do not. Separatist parties are coded as 1 for *pro-EU* if they want their country or territory to be a member of the European Union, and 0 if they do not.

Finally, I distinguish among parties in terms of the strategies they use to achieve independence and more specifically, whether they advocate the use of violence in this regard. Non-violent separatist parties should benefit more from integration than violent separatist parties because the European Free Alliance (EFA) does not permit violent parties to join its ranks. I code parties as *violent* if they use or advocate the use of violence to achieve their political goals, and 0 otherwise.

Control Variables

I also include a number of time-varying control variables in the analysis to account for concurrent changes in countries over the post-WWII period that may influence the demands of subnational groups for independence. I do not include non-time varying control variables in the analysis, like the regional dispersion of ethnic groups in a country, even though they might affect separatist sentiment, because they cannot affect changes in separatist sentiment within countries over time. I control for these issues by using country fixed effects in the analysis.

Since decentralization may offset demands for independence, I measure it with an indicator variable coded 1 if at least one region in a country has independent decision-making power over at least one political issue area and 0 otherwise (Brancati 2006). To capture the extent of political and fiscal decentralization in countries, I use a 4-point index of decentralization based on whether: (1) regional legislatures are elected in countries, and whether these legislatures have control over (2) education and (3) public order and police, and (4) whether they can raise or levy their own taxes (Brancati 2006). Countries receive a point

on this index for each characteristic they possess.

I also measure GDP per capita (constant 2000 USD) using the *World Development Indicators* (1960-2010) because, like decentralization, economic wealth can offset the negative consequences of integration for some countries (Sambanis 2006). I also measure natural resource wealth in terms of oil rents (% of GDP) using the World Development Indicators. Only three countries in the dataset have sizable oil sectors: Norway, Romania and the United Kingdom and in only two of these countries, Romania (Transylvania) and United Kingdom (Scotland), are oil reserves located in separatist regions.

To control for concurrent military integration in Europe, I measure membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). NATO, established in 1949 four years before the first wave of economic integration in Europe, may promote separatism if independence-seeking regions look toward NATO to provide military security for them, especially against attempts by states to reabsorb them. NATO intervened in Bosnia-Herzegovina (1992-1995) and Kosovo (1999) for this purpose.⁷ I code *NATO* membership as a 1 if a country is a member of NATO in a given year and 0 otherwise.

I measure the level of democracy in countries using the Polity IV Index ranging from -10 (authoritarianism) to +10 (democracy).⁸ Separatism should be lower when democracy is greater because groups are more likely in this context than in another to use the political system to address the concerns that drive the demand for independence in the first place. While, in principle, separatists could be weaker when elections are less democratic since separatist parties cannot effectively compete in these elections, very few separatist parties

⁷I do not code Warsaw Pact (1955-1991) membership in this study because Eastern European countries, which were members of the Warsaw pact, are only included in the analysis post-1989 and because the same logic by which NATO membership might further separatism does not apply to the Soviet security configuration.

⁸I use the modified PolityIV data provided by (Gleditsch 2008), which uses data from older versions of the Polity IV dataset in order to fill missing data in the current version for countries, such as Iceland and Luxembourg, which are excluded because their population is small.

have been banned in Europe in the post-WWII period, and these ban have not affected countries' democracy ratings.

Transitions to democracy are also likely to affect the electoral strength of separatist parties because the issues related to the structure of the political system are salient at this time. I measure transitional periods based on whether elections are the first democratic ones in a country or not using an indicator variable coded 1 for the first democratic elections in a country, and 0 otherwise. I consider elections to be the first democratic elections in a country if they score 5 or higher on the Polity IV index and occur after an extended period of non-democratic rule (a period of 10 years or longer with a Polity IV score of 4 or lower).

Finally, I measure the type of electoral system in a country based on average district magnitude. The proportionality of the electoral system can affect the percentage of votes and seats that separatist parties win in an election. Separatist parties tend to be small and to win more votes under more proportional systems (Duverger 1969). The higher the average district magnitude the more proportional is the electoral system.

Results

In the analysis to follow, I use ordinary least regression (OLS) with robust standard errors and country fixed effects to evaluate the effect of economic integration. Table 1 presents the results of the analysis for all separatist parties regardless of their political ideologies and strategies.

[Table 1]

Model 1 examines the effect of integration on separatism in terms of EU integration. According to the model, EU integration has a trivial, but significant effect on the vote for separatist parties. The vote for separatist parties is about half a percentage point higher when countries are members of the EMU, the highest form of EU integration, than when

they are not members of any integration scheme. These results are driven by two countries – Belgium and the United Kingdom. The effect of EU integration is no longer significant if either of these two countries are dropped from the analysis.⁹

Model 2 investigates the effect of trade and NATO membership. Neither EU integration nor trade has a significant effect on the vote for separatist parties in this model. These variables are not insignificant because the effect of EU integration and trade cancel each other out. The correlation between EU integration and trade is low ($r=0.142$) and trade is still not significant if EU integration is excluded from the model. Including trade in the model, though, reduces the number of elections in the analysis and it excludes the early post-WWII period when there EU integration was either limited or non-existent. NATO membership is also not significant in this model.

In Model 3, I measure integration in terms of foreign investment instead of trade. In this model, neither FDI (outflows) and FDI (inflows) are significant. The two FDI measures are not significant if each is included separately in the model. Model 4 controls for domestic factors that vary over the post-WWII period but do not vary as a function of economic integration. EU integration has a trivial, but significant, effect on integration in this model. None of the control variables are significant in the model. Again, the results for EU integration are sensitive to the case selection. If I drop Belgium from the analysis, the effect of EU integration is no longer significant.

In Model 5, I add control variables for domestic factors that vary over the post-WWII period and are potentially affected by economic integration. EU integration is not significant in Model 5, but both decentralization and GDP per capita are significant. In fact, decentralization increases the strength of separatist parties to a greater extent than EU integration.

⁹In a separate model, I also test the effect on integration on the total possible vote for separatist parties (voting percentage for separatist parties and coalitions including at least one separatist party). The effect of EU integration is statistical and substantively the same.

The vote for separatist parties is almost 9 percentage points higher in decentralized countries than in centralized countries. If I replace the dichotomous measure of decentralization with the index of decentralization, or if I add oil rents to the model, the former is positively and significantly related to separatist party strength, while the latter is positive but not significant (models not shown). While the effect of integration is no longer significant in Model 5, it is not due to decentralization offsetting the effects of EU integration as (Sambanis 2006) argues, with integration causing decentralization and decentralization reducing demands for independence. The correlation between the EU integration and decentralization is low ($r=0.105$) and decentralization increases the strength of separatist parties, as Brancati (2006, 2009) suggests that it can depending on how it designed. It does not reduce it.¹⁰

In the next set of models, I investigate the interaction between EU integration and certain characteristics of separatist parties on the percentage of votes that separatist parties win. These models are presented in Table 2. Since the purpose of this analysis is to explain variation among separatist parties, not to establish the overall effect of economic integration as in the previous models, the unit of analysis in these models is the vote for individual separatist parties. The models are estimated using OLS regression with robust standard errors and party fixed effects.¹¹ All statements in the text regarding the relationship between economic integration and certain types of political parties in the models are based on the joint significance of the main effect and the relevant interaction terms.

[Table 2]

Model 5 examines the relevance of regional economic wealth to separatist party support.

¹⁰The insignificant effect of EU integration is not due to there being fewer elections included in this analysis. Dropping GDP per capita from the model to include the early post-WWII period in the analysis, does not change the results.

¹¹In order to maximize the number of elections included in the analysis, the models include only those control variables for which data is available over the entire post-WWII period.

According to the model, the European Union is less favorable to separatist parties in rich regions than those in poor regions in contrast to expectations. There are only three rich regions in the analysis, however, which are located in two countries – Spain (Basque Country and Catalonia) and Italy (Northern Italy).¹² Most separatist parties in these regions have supported EU integration and the regions themselves have benefited from integration. Thus, it is unlikely that separatist parties have performed worse in these countries on average because they represent rich regions, but because of other confounding issues. Most of the parties in Spain are ideologically on the left, and several of them have opposed EU integration and advocated the use of violence to achieve their goals. As the subsequent models will demonstrate, these are characteristics not likely to be favored by EU integration.

Model 6 examines the effect of parties' left-right ideological positions on the vote for separatist parties. Right-wing parties, according to the model, benefit slightly more from EU integration than left-wing parties, as expected. As members of the EU, right-wing parties win almost a quarter of a percentage point more votes than left-wing parties. Right-wing parties grew the most in this period in Belgium. If Belgium is dropped from the analysis, the EU is less favorable to right-wing parties than left-wing parties. All of the right-wing parties in the analysis are also supportive of EU membership, but all of the left-wing parties are not. For this reason, I examine the effect of parties' attitudes toward the European Union directly in Model 7.

According to Model 7, separatist parties that support EU integration do not benefit more from integration than those that oppose it and, in fact, benefit more from it, in contrast to expectations. One potential explanation for this result is that separatist parties benefit from opposition to the EU by attracting votes away from other parties that support integration

¹²The results are the same if I redefine the term rich to include economically advanced without above average GDPs, such as Flanders (Belgium) and Bavaria (Germany and West Germany).

if integration is not popular among the electorate. In Italy, the Northern League, although it was no longer separatist at the time, changed its position on the EU from one of support to one of opposition in the late 1990s in part to resuscitate its waning electoral fortunes (Giordano 2004). Similarly, Plaid Cymru softened its position toward the EU in the 1980s in part to attract votes away from its main rival in Wales, the Labour Party. Another potential explanation is that whether or not parties support membership in the EU does not sufficiently distinguish among their attitudes toward the EU in general. That is, most of the separatist parties in the analysis support membership in the European Union, but many are still highly critical of it.

All of the violent separatist parties in the analysis have also opposed integration. Therefore, in Model 8, I examine the interaction between violence and EU integration directly. According to the model, the EU favors non-violent separatist parties slightly over violent ones, as expected. As members of the EU, non-violent parties win a quarter of a percentage point more votes than violent parties. Violent separatist parties, though, have won seats in only two countries – Spain and the United Kingdom. These parties are: Herri Batasuna (HB) and the Basque Country Left (EE) in Spain, and Sinn Fein in Northern Ireland. All three of these parties at one point opposed membership in the EU and none have been members of the European Free Alliance (EFA).

The results of the previous statistical analysis suggest that there is a very weak and trivial effect of EU integration, but not foreign trade or investment, on separatism. The overall effect of integration and even the individual party effects to an extent, are driven by two countries, Belgium and the United Kingdom. Belgium and the UK are the only two countries in the analysis in which the electoral strength of separatist parties is significantly higher under more extensive forms of integration. Separatist parties did not win more votes in any country in the analysis in which they had not already won votes, and there is no

country in the analysis in which regional parties expanded their demands for autonomy to include independence, but there are several cases in which the reverse is true.

Discussion

Since the results of the previous statistical analysis are driven by two countries - Belgium and the United Kingdom, I investigate more closely in this section these two countries to determine to what extent economic integration has actually contributed to the growth of separatist parties in these countries.

Belgium

In Belgium, two parties are primarily responsible for the increased support for separatist parties – the Vlaams Block (VB), renamed the Vlaams Belang in 2004, and the New Flemish Alliance (N-VA).¹³ Both parties advocate the independence of Flanders, the Dutch-speaking region of Belgium, from the country. In 1981, in the first national elections in which VB competed, the party won only 1 seat. In 2010, it won 12. N-VA's rise has been more dramatic. Like VB, N-VA also won only 1 seat in the first national elections in which it competed in 2003. In the third elections it competed in less than 10 years later, it won 27.

While VB's rise coincided with the creation of the European Union in the 1990s, it was not due to European integration, but to Flanders' impressive economic growth in the previous two decades (Newman 1996; Wagstaff 1999). Flanders' growth was based in light industries, particularly petrochemicals, as well as unprecedented foreign investment in the port region. As Flanders' growth outpaced that of Wallonia, many within the region increasingly felt

¹³There is a third separatist party currently active in Belgium that wins seats, Lijst Dedecker (LDD). However, its vote has not significantly contributed to the overall rise in separatist party support in Belgium since LDD won 5 seats in the Chamber of Representatives when it first appeared on the electoral scene in 2007, and only 1 seat in 2010. LDD, which was formed by Jean-Marie Dedecker after a split from N-VA, is a right-wing, neo-liberal party, critical of the European Union. Much of the support for this party is due to the popularity of Dedecker.

that government policies favoring Wallonia were hindering Flanders further development. Flanders had very limited fiscal autonomy at the time and most taxes were collected at the federal level, giving the region little discretion over how its taxes were spent. These taxes, Flemish separatists averred, were unduly used to subsidize Wallonia, whose economy was still based in heavy industries and suffering from higher unemployment. These concerns continue to drive support for separatism in Flanders today.

At the time, VB was very critical of the European Union although it supported Belgium's membership in the Union, and did not use the EU to increase its electoral support in Flanders (Breuning 2007; Dardanelli 2010). In 1993, VB voted against the Maastricht Treaty, which established the European Union, because it did not sufficiently protect minority languages and cultures in Europe and codified a centralized decision-making apparatus. VB remains very critical of the European Union today, and does not try to exploit EU integration to advance its cause of independence (Breuning 2007; Dardanelli 2010). The EU, according to VB, impinges unnecessarily on the sovereignty of states and wants the competencies of the EU curtailed, especially in terms of culture and education. VB voted against the Constitutional and Lisbon Treaties and opposes the currency union.

N-VA appeared on the political scene in 2001. It was formed from a split within the moderate Volksunie (VU) party over constitutional reforms adopted this year. The more radical faction of the party, which evolved into the N-VA, criticized the reforms for not extending sufficient autonomy to the regions. The 2001 reforms were the first major initiatives that Belgium undertook to address demands for more autonomy in the country since 1993, the year Belgium officially became a federal state. The 2001 reforms extended the authorities of the community and regional councils to include agriculture, fisheries, and foreign trade, among other issues. These reforms did not quiet demands for independence, though, and actually contributed to the division of the country's party system along linguistic lines

(Brancati 2009).

The EU forms a more central part of N-VA's strategy to achieve independence than that of VB (Dardanelli 2010). N-VA believes that Flanders benefits economically from membership in the European Union and wants Flanders to be an independent state within the EU. Unlike VB, it has voted in favor of the Constitutional and Lisbon Treaties, and even wants the authorities of the European Union to be extended in certain areas. These areas include defense, foreign affairs, migration, energy and so forth. N-VA has criticized the EU as well, but its criticism is much more muted. N-VA opposes enlargement of the Union to include Turkey. It wants more protection for minority languages and more decentralized decision-making within the Union. The latter includes the direct election of the president of the European Commission and a stricter application of the principle of subsidiarity.

To the extent that the EU has contributed to either parties' support, it has not been through these parties' interaction with other separatist parties at the EU level. Both VB and N-VA have representatives in the European Union. However, their interactions with representatives from other separatist parties are not extensive and not likely to have contributed to their political support at home as a result. They have also not occurred through the expected channels – the European Free Alliance (EFA) and the Committee of the Regions. VB is not a member of the EFA and does not participate in the Committee of Regions because it does not consider Flanders a region, but a distinct nation. N-VA is currently a member of the EFA, but it only joined the EFA in 2010.

With the EU headquartered in Brussels, separatist parties in Belgium should be more likely than separatist parties in other countries to use the EU to increase their electoral support at home. Yet, EU integration has contributed at most to the support of only one separatist party in the country, N-VA, and only in the last decade. While both VB and N-VA are right-wing parties, which represent an economically prosperous region that benefits

from international trade and investment, only N-VA has tried to use the Union to increase its electoral support at home. VB has been very critical of the EU, not because of economic reasons, as we might expect of left-wing parties, but because EU integration infringes on Flanders sovereignty. Thus, the case of Belgium demonstrates that opposition to the EU and a reluctance to use it to garner support for separatism, can come from even those most likely to benefit from economic integration.

United Kingdom

Three parties have contributed to the increased support for separatist parties in the UK – Sinn Fein in Northern Ireland, the Scottish National Party (SNP) in Scotland, and Plaid Cymru (PC) in Wales. While these parties existed earlier, they only began to win seats in the parliament in the 1970s and the 1980s, and of these three parties, only Sinn Fein has grown significantly since this time.¹⁴ Sinn Fein won 5 seats in the House of Commons in 2010, twice as many seats as it won in the previous two decades. The SNP's support peaked in the 1970s while Plaid Cymru's has remained rather constant ever since. The SNP won 6 seats and PC won 3 in 2010.

The historic rise of these parties was not due to European integration, which had not changed significantly at this time, but to concurrent domestic changes within the UK. Sinn Fein began to have electoral success in the 1980s after a split in the IRA led the organization to support a political strategy to coincide with its existing military one, and after Sinn Fein rescinded its abstentionist policy preventing elected members of the party from occupying their seats in the parliament (McAllister 2004). The SNP's surge in popularity at this time resulted from the discovery of oil in the North Sea in the 1970s, which shocked many into thinking that Scotland could sustain itself as an independent state (Hueglin 1986). Plaid

¹⁴Sinn Fein did win seats, though, in one earlier general election. In 1955, Sinn Fein won 2 seats in the House of Commons elections.

Cymru made major strides in this period by transforming itself from a radical Welsh language pressure group to a more inclusive nationalist party with a broad socioeconomic program (Elias 2006). It also took advantage of the the Labour party's waning popularity in Wales at the time to attract votes within the region (Evans 2006).

All three parties did not use the EU to increase their electoral support and, in fact, outright opposed membership in the European Union at this time. The parties objected to the EU's centralized decision-making apparatus, which limited their influence in the organization, and its curtailment of state sovereignty (Murray and Tonge 2005; Lynch 1996; Laible 2002; Jones 2009). As left-wing parties representing poor, largely agricultural regions, they also objected to the EU's excessive emphasis on free market principles, while Plaid Cymru, with pacifist leanings, objected to its nuclearization of Europe's defense policy. The SNP and PC did not change their attitude toward membership in the European Union until the late 1980s and only recently in 2003 has Plaid Cymru adopted an explicit position of 'independence' within Europe rather than 'full national status' (Elias 2006; Hepburn 2006). Sinn Fein did not change its position toward membership in the European Union until 1999 and membership in the currency union until 2003.

Sinn Fein is the only one of these three parties whose electoral support has grown since the 1980s, but it has not grown as a result of the party's attempts to use EU integration to increase its popularity. Even after changing its position toward membership in the European Union, Sinn Fein has not actively tried to use the EU to enhance its electoral support (Murray and Tonge 2005). In fact, Sinn Fein is highly critical of the European Union and is not a member of the EFA. Sinn Fein wants the authorities of the EU curtailed, especially in regards to foreign policy and security, and its institutions democratized. It rejected the Lisbon Treaty for diminishing the influence of Northern Ireland within the Union., and also disputes certain EU policies favoring free trade over the agricultural and rural development

of Northern Ireland, as well as various EU policies on taxes, fisheries, and justice.

Unlike Sinn Fein, the SNP and PC have tried to use the EU to increase their electoral support in recent decades and are members of the EFA, but have not been successful in this regard. Both the SNP and Plaid Cymru, seeing membership in the Union as a foregone conclusion, reversed their earlier positions on the European Union in order to garner more electoral support at home (Elias 2006; Hepburn 2006). Both parties are limited, however, in the extent to which they can effectively use the EU to garner more votes because they frequently criticize the EU for advancing policies harmful to their regions. Plaid Cymru, for example, has frequently rebuked the Union's policies on agriculture while the SNP has continually found fault with its policies on fisheries. Both also remain critical of the EU's centralized decision-making apparatus.

The UK has tried to offset demands for independence from the regions by granting them autonomy in 1997. However, the government's decision at this time was not due to integration making the regions' threats to secede more credible. Northern Ireland posed the greatest threat to the unity of the UK at this time and it adamantly opposed membership in the European Union at the time. The Labour party, which came to power three years earlier, pushed through these reforms for ideological and political reasons (Mitchell 1998). The reforms have not dampened Sinn Fein's popularity in Northern Ireland.

In both Belgium and the UK, the growth in support for separatist parties is most likely due to domestic changes within these countries, not EU integration. Separatist parties in both these countries regardless of their ideological perspectives are often very critical of the European Union and have even outright rejected membership in it at times. Many of the reasons that separatist parties have opposed EU integration in these two countries are, in fact, intrinsic to separatist parties, such as state sovereignty and minority rights, and are likely to be echoed by separatist parties in other countries.

Conclusion

Arguments that economic integration will unleash separatism and lead to the unfurling of the modern state are overblown. The quantitative analysis shows that the relationship between European integration and separatist party support is trivial and driven by two countries – Belgium and the United Kingdom. Further analysis suggests that the growth in separatist party support in these countries is not likely to be due to economic integration or the strategic use of the European Union by separatist parties to enhance their electoral support, but to concurrent changes in these countries political and economic environments, which were not captured by the quantitative analysis. In fact, even in these countries, separatist parties have been very critical of the European Union and have outright opposed membership in it at times.

Economic integration does not have the effect expect of it because of decentralization as others have argued, but because states retain important political powers even in the face of integration and because separatist movements by their very nature want it this way. Separatist movements often oppose extensive forms of integration because it undermines state sovereignty and is harmful to regions, especially poor regions that are reliant on state subsidies and other government protections for survival. The fact that separatist movements are often highly critical of integration limits the extent to which they try to capitalize on it in order to enhance their electoral support at home.

Europe is the region for which integration is most likely to increase separatism. Yet, the effect is trivial and at best, isolated to a few specific parties in the region. While the effect of integration could increase in the future as the world becomes more integrated, the recent concerns about the survival of the currency union suggest there are limitations, even in Europe, to how much states are willing to link their fate to that of others. Separatist parties are also likely to oppose even more aggressively further threats to their sovereignty.

While further integration can help some separatists attain their goal of independence, it also cuts against it, threatening to undermine the sovereignty of the states that they ultimately aspire to form.

Table 1

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
EU	0.12*	0.11	-0.04	0.20*	0.08
	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.08)	(0.11)
NATO		-0.39		-0.47*	-0.73
		(0.23)		(0.23)	(0.50)
Trade		0.01			0.00
		(0.01)			(0.01)
FDI (inflows)			0.06		
			(0.05)		
FDI (outflows)			0.01		
			(0.01)		
First Elections				0.06	-0.10
				(0.27)	(0.23)
Polity				-0.10	-0.13
				(0.08)	(0.10)
Average DM				-0.02	-0.05
				(0.03)	(0.09)
GDP per capita					0.00
					(0.00)
Decentralization					2.89*
					(1.27)
Constant	-0.00	-0.37	-0.23	0.71	0.81
	(0.00)	(0.55)	(0.19)	(0.60)	(0.54)
Observations	305	255	209	297	247
R^2	0.391	0.400	0.601	0.474	0.560

** p<0.01, * p<0.05

Table 2

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
EU	0.26*	0.19**	0.38*	0.21**
	(0.10)	(0.06)	(0.18)	(0.07)
EU*Rich	-0.19			
	(0.14)			
Rich	-0.91			
	(0.62)			
EU*Right		0.07		
		(0.18)		
Right		-3.02		
		(2.14)		
EU*ProEU			-0.18	
			(0.24)	
ProEU			0.43	
			(0.59)	
EU*Violent				-0.10
				(0.10)
Violent				0.71
				(0.38)
NATO	-0.36*	-0.44*	-0.48	-0.39*
	(0.14)	(0.19)	(0.25)	(0.16)
First Elections	0.97	0.97	1.46*	1.01*
	(0.51)	(0.50)	(0.66)	(0.48)
Average DM	0.18	0.19*	0.16	0.19*
	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.12)	(0.11)
Decentralization	0.55*	0.42*	0.74	0.45*
	(0.25)	(0.18)	(0.40)	(0.19)
Constant	-0.62*	-1.69**	12.30**	-1.81*
	(0.35)	(0.79)	(0.66)	(0.87)
R^2	0.506	0.498	0.495	0.504
F-test	4.33 (0.01)	5.80 (0.00)	3.64(0.01)	4.34 (0.01)
Observations	413	349	269	413

** p<0.01, * p<0.05

APPENDIX

Separatist Political Parties in Western and Eastern Europe, 1945-2008

Belgium

Flemish Block (Vlaams Blok)
New Flemish Alliance (Nieuw-Vlaamse Alliantie)
Flemish Interest (Vlaams Belang)
Dedecker List (Lijst Dedecker)

Bosnia-Herzegovina

Serbian Radical Party of Republic of Serbia (Srpska Radikalna Stranka Republike Srpske)
Serbian Democratic Party (Srpska Demokratska Stranka)

France

Guadeloupe Communist Party (Parti Communiste Guadeloupen)
Martinique Independence Movement (Mouvement Indpendantiste Martiniquais)

Germany

Bavarian Party (Bayernpartei)

Italy

Northern League (Lega Nord)

Moldova

Unity Movement (Unitate-Edinstvo)†

Spain

Basque Country Left (Euskadiko Ezkerra)
Basque Solidarity (Eusko Alkartasuna)
Basque Left (Euskal Ezkerra)
Canarian Peoples Union Coalition (Coalición-Unión del Pueblo Canario)
Catalonian Left Electoral Coalition (Coalición Electoral Esquerra de Catalunya)
Catalonian Republican Left (Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya)
Conservatives of Catalunya (Conservadors de Catalunya)
National Front (Front Nacional)
Peoples Union (Herri Batasuna)

United Kingdom

Anti-partition Party
Independent Nationalist Party
Independent Unity Party
Irish Nationalist Party

Irish Republican Party
Plaid Cymru
Republican Labour Party
Scottish National Party
Sinn Fein
Unity

†Member of pre-electoral coalition only.

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