

# Why Democracy Protests Do Not Diffuse<sup>\*</sup>

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# Why Democracy Protests Do Not Diffuse

## Abstract

One of the primary international factors proposed to explain the geographic and temporal clustering of democracy is the diffusion of democracy protests. Democracy protests are thought to diffuse across countries primarily through a demonstration effect, whereby protests in one country cause protests in another based on the positive information that they convey about the likelihood of successful protests elsewhere, and secondarily, through the actions of transnational activists. In contrast to this view, we argue, that, in general, democracy protests are not likely to diffuse across countries because the motivation for and the outcome of democracy protests results from domestic processes that are unaffected or undermined by the occurrence of democracy protests in other countries. Our statistical analysis supports this argument. Using daily data on the onset of democracy protests around the world between 1989 and 2011, we found that in this period, democracy protests were not significantly more likely to occur in countries when democracy protests occurred in neighboring countries either in general or in ways consistent with the expectations of diffusion arguments.

Democracy exists in both geographic and temporal clusters (Huntington 1991; Jagers and Gurr 1995; Starr and Lindborg 2003; Brinks and Coppedge 2006; Gleditsch and Ward 2006; Leeson and Dean 2009). At the beginning of the twentieth century, democracy was isolated to a few countries in North America and Western Europe. After World War II, it expanded to Latin America and Asia, toppling military regimes and colonial powers in the process. Shortly after the end of the Cold War, democracy moved into East Central Europe, where it dislodged deep-rooted communist regimes, and made significant inroads into Africa. Today, democracies constitute about two-thirds of all independent states in the world (Marshall and Gurr 2015). These trends, as well as the slow-changing nature of most domestic correlates of democracy, have led scholars to hypothesize that democracy is not only a function of the domestic conditions within countries, but international factors as well.

One of the primary international factors proposed to explain the geographic and temporal clustering of democracy is the diffusion of democracy protests. Democracy protests, which are public demonstrations in which participants demand countries adopt or uphold open and competitive elections, are thought to diffuse primarily through a demonstration effect and secondarily, through transnational activists. According to the former, protests in one country precipitate protests in another based on the positive information that they convey about the likelihood of successful protests elsewhere, while according to the latter, they diffuse through the direct actions of activists who provide material support to activists in other countries.

As evidence of these processes, scholars point to the large number of countries that have experienced protests at any one time, and to the fact that where protests are believed to have diffused, protesters were aware of earlier protests, made reference to these protests, and adopted similar strategies, tactics, and goals (Bunce and Wolchik 2006; Weyland 2009; Beissinger 2007; Kuran 2011; Mitchell 2012). Fears of protests diffusing in this way have compelled autocratic leaders around the world to undertake measures to prevent protests

from occurring in their countries – ranging from the tyrannical (e.g., increased censorship, government purges, and opposition arrests) to the paranoid (e.g., banning protest symbols such as Jasmine flowers and the color orange).

In contrast to these expectations, we argue that, in general, democracy protests are not likely to diffuse across countries because the motivation for and the outcome of democracy protests results primarily from domestic processes that are either unaffected or undermined by the occurrence of democracy protests elsewhere. Democracy protests arise when strong public sentiment against governments, derived from political, social, or economic grievances, is triggered by internal events, such as elections and economic crises, which facilitate collective action against governments by making individuals cognizant of their shared opposition to regimes. In general, the occurrence of democracy protests in neighboring countries does not raise this level of discontent, nor does it facilitate collective action on behalf of it. In fact, most democracy protests in neighboring countries are poor models for protests elsewhere and can lead governments to undertake measures to block protests from occurring in their own countries.

To evaluate our argument, we conduct the first cross-national and longitudinal statistical analysis of the diffusion of democracy protests. Existing studies on the diffusion of democracy show a strong statistical correlation between the presence of democracy in one country and the presence of democracy in neighboring countries and/or the world overall, but they are unable to distinguish empirically among the different mechanisms through which democracy might diffuse (Starr 1991; Jagers and Gurr 1995; Starr and Lindborg 2003; Brinks and Coppedge 2006; Gleditsch and Ward 2006; Franzese and Hays 2008; Leeson and Dean 2009; Mainwaring and Pérez-Liñán 2014). To understand these mechanisms, it is essential to examine the diffusion of democracy protests apart from the diffusion of democracy, because even if protests themselves diffuse, their political successes might not (Saideman 2012; Hale 2014). Existing studies on democracy protests show, meanwhile, the influence of democracy

protests on each other, but their conclusions are not necessarily generalizable since they are based on qualitative descriptions of the most prominent waves of democracy protests (Bunce and Wolchik 2006; Beissinger 2007; Weyland 2009, 2012; della Porta 2014).

Our statistical analysis supports our argument. Using daily data on the onset of democracy protests around the world between 1989 and 2011, we found that in this period, democracy protests were not significantly more likely to occur in countries when democracy protests occurred in neighboring countries regardless of the number or size of these protests. Democracy protests were also not more likely to occur in this period in ways consistent with diffusion arguments. That is, democracy protests were not significantly more likely to occur in this period when protests in neighboring countries were not repressed or were able to extract political concessions from governments. Nor, were they more likely to occur when neighboring protests occurred in influential countries or politically and socio-economically similar countries. Thus, it seems that if democracy does diffuse to other countries, it is not likely a result of democracy protests.

### **How Democracy Protests Are Thought to Diffuse**

Democracy protests are believed to diffuse primarily through demonstration effects, and secondarily, through transnational activists.<sup>1</sup> According to the concept of demonstration effects, protests spread across borders because protests in neighboring countries provide activists in other countries with a focal point around which to coordinate action against regimes (Kuran 1989, 2011; Lohmann 1994), and raise the expectations of these activists that similar actions are likely to be successful in their own countries (Tarrow 1991, 1994; McAdam and Rucht 1993; Soule 1997; Givan, Roberts and Soule 2010). Demonstration effects are believed to be the main reason why anti-regime contention spread throughout

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<sup>1</sup>These processes are those most relevant and offered to explain the diffusion of democracy protests. See Elkins and Simmons (2005) for a review of the range of mechanisms through which other events, policies, and institutions are argued to diffuse.

Europe in 1848 (Weyland 2009; Gilardi, Bamert and Wasserfallen 2015), in East Central Europe in 1989 and the early 2000s (Kuran 1991; Lohmann 1994; Beissinger 2007; Mitchell 2012), and more recently, in the Middle East and North Africa with the so-called Arab Spring (Kuran 2011).

As evidence of the presence of demonstration effects in these four historical periods, scholars point to the fact that people involved in subsequent protests were aware of earlier protests, referenced events related to them, and used these protests as a rallying cry to urge people in their own countries to rise up against their governments. They also point to the fact that the protests were massive in scale and arose unexpectedly and spontaneously in many different contexts in short succession of each other. In the case of the 1848 Revolutions, protests occurred in three countries (i.e., Germany, Vienna, and Denmark) less than one month after Louis Philippe I was dethroned in France. Likewise, within one month of Tunisia's Jasmine Revolution, protests erupted in Algeria and Jordan and shortly thereafter in Egypt and Yemen. The Color Revolutions occurred over a longer time interval, but the 1989 protests in East Central Europe occurred in close succession of each other.

In support of diffusion theories, scholars also note that subsequent protests in these periods used similar frames, strategies, and repertoires as earlier protests (Bunce and Wolchik 2006; Beissinger 2007; Saideman 2012; della Porta 2014). Most of the Color Revolutions were organized around electoral fraud. The Arab Spring protests were not organized around a single catalyzing event, but particular events were organized around similar themes like "A Day of Rage", common occasions, such as Friday afternoon prayers, and physical spaces, like central squares (Patel 2014). They also were organized, as were the Color Revolutions, through similar mediums, such as Twitter and Facebook (Lotan et al. 2011).

Transnational activists are also thought to play a role, albeit a less significant one, in the diffusion of democracy protests in these periods. According to diffusion arguments, transnational activists help protests diffuse by disseminating information about protests to

activists in other countries, and by providing them with the training and resources needed to organize their own protests (Tarrow 2005; Bunce and Wolchik 2006; Beissinger 2007). The Serbian opposition group, Otpor!, which organized the Bulldozer Revolution, is known to have trained activists responsible for the Rose Revolution in Georgia, as well as members of Pora, which played a central role in the Orange Revolution.

Outside the Color Revolutions, however, most research finds that transnational activists have played little role in the development of democracy protests in other countries, including the 1848 Revolutions (Weyland 2009, 2012), the 1989 protests in East Central Europe (Kotkin 2009; Kuran 1991; Lohmann 1994), and the Arab Spring protests (Gana 2013).<sup>2</sup> In these periods, transnational activities were few in number, isolated from activists in other countries, and short of the resources needed to export protests to other countries (Lynch 2012; Saideman 2012; Weyland 2012).

Diffusion arguments, including both those about demonstration effects and those about transnational activists, differ in the importance they place on domestic conditions. Some diffusion arguments suggest that protests in neighboring countries are merely triggers for protests in other countries, responsible for the timing of protests, but not whether or not protests occur. Other arguments assign greater weight to neighboring protests, claiming that protests in neighboring countries provide activists with the critical push needed to organize protests that they otherwise would not. Other arguments go still further, arguing that neighboring protests cause protests to occur in countries even when domestic conditions favoring protests are weak. Beissinger (2007) claims, for example, that “the effect of example is to make action and even successful action materialize in cases in which they would not have otherwise been likely, so that example makes possible action and outcomes that structure alone would not have permitted” (173).

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<sup>2</sup>Otpor! also trained activists in Tunisia through workshops indirectly sponsored by the US government. By most accounts, however, the workshop attendees neither initiated nor organized the Jasmine Revolution (Gana 2013, 151-2).

Most diffusion arguments also recognize that whether or not protests diffuse, and what forms they assume, depends on the domestic and international context in which they arise (Solingen 2012). According to these arguments, democracy protests are more likely to diffuse to other countries depending on people's awareness of earlier protests, as well as the degree to which earlier protests raise people's expectations about the likely success of protests in their own countries. Proximity is thought to raise people's awareness of prior protests because it influences the extent to which people interact with each other, share a common language, occupy a common media market, and so forth (Starr 1991; Gleditsch and Ward 2006; Kopstein and Reilly 2000). A country's political and economic importance is also said to raise people's awareness of protests in other countries since instability in these countries can have greater consequences for neighboring countries than protests in other countries. (Elkins 2008).

Democracy protests are thought to raise people's expectations about the likely success of protests in their own countries when protests in other countries are successful, defined either in terms of their size or ability to achieve their goals (Buenrostro, Dhillon and Wooders 2007; Gilardi, Bamert and Wasserfallen 2015), and occur in countries with similar socio-economic, political and cultural backgrounds (McAdam, McCarthy and Zald 1996; Bunce and Wolchik 2006; Beissinger 2007; Elkins 2008). Many characteristics of countries are hypothesized to influence diffusion processes in this way, including economic development, democracy, state repressiveness, and nationalist sentiment, among others. Where the appropriate context for protests to diffuse does not exist, some diffusion scholars contend that activists adopt other forms of regime contention, such as roundtables and national conferences, more suitable for their country (della Porta and Tarrow 2012; Bunce, Patel and Wolchik 2013; Weyland 2014).

## Democracy Protests: Poor Models for Protests Elsewhere

In contrast to these arguments, we argue that, in general, democracy protests are not likely to diffuse to other countries through either demonstration effects or transnational activists. We consider democracy protests to have diffused from one country to another country if, and only if, protests in one country made protests in the other more likely to occur.<sup>3</sup> Our understanding of diffusion does not rule out the possibility that democracy protests are larger or occur sooner when protests arise in other countries due to the excitement and attention surrounding earlier protests. Or, that other aspects of protests, including their strategies or tactics, spread across borders.

Democracy protests, we argue, are not likely to diffuse to other countries because democracy protests arise out of domestic processes that are either unaffected or undermined by the occurrence of democracy protests in other countries. Although democracy protests result from domestic processes, they do not arise only, or necessarily, as a result of a strong public sentiment in favor of democracy, but arise for other reasons including, most notably, opposition to an existing government in general (Beissinger 2013; Chaisty and Whitefield 2013). At the same time, many people who desire democracy are unwilling to organize democracy protests, or participate in them, because they are unaware of the extent to which others oppose the regime, question the likely success of protests in their countries, and fear the consequences of failed actions (Kuran 1989).

Elections and economic crises are two important factors shown to trigger democracy protests because they not only generate opposition to the regime, but also make people aware of their shared opposition to it. In the run-up to elections in authoritarian regimes, leaders often either suspend elections, alter the electoral system in their favor, or commit

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<sup>3</sup>Our conceptualization of diffusion is similar to Stang (1991, 325) and Elkins and Simmons (2005, 36-38). They define diffusion as any process in which prior adoption of a trait or practice alters the probability of adoption for the remaining non-adopters. For an alternative view, see Weyland (2014), who argues that “[s]ince external stimuli [for a political transformation] do not always lead to successful emulation, diffusion should not be defined by increased chances of emulation” (32)

electoral fraud in order to remain in power (Tucker 2007; Hyde and Marinov 2014; Bunce and Wolchik 2013; Beaulieu 2014). Not only do these actions provoke anger against the regime, but they also suggest to the public that opposition to the regime is strong because a genuinely popular regime would not have to resort to these actions. Fraud-ridden elections are said to be especially likely to provoke protests when the incumbent leaders are in their final term of office and elites vie for control over and influence within the succeeding government (Hale 2005).

Economic crises also raise societal discontent for governments in general, and authoritarianism in particular, because governments wield significant responsibility over their countries' economies. Even when governments are not directly responsible for crises, the public often blames governments for them regardless because it lacks information about the real causes of crises, which are often highly technical, complicated, and contested (Brancati 2016). As a result, the public tends to evaluate a government's job performance based on fluctuations in their own well-being, grading it highly when the public is doing well economically and poorly when it is not. This discontent increases support for opposition candidates who are more likely to organize protests in election periods when opposition support is high, especially when opposition candidates lose elections by small margins of victory, which signals to candidates that they likely would have won the elections had they been clean, and that any protests that they were to organize would attract wide support (Brancati 2016).

The occurrence of democracy protests in other countries is not likely to strengthen these motivations and, if anything, is likely to undermine them. Countries are not likely to hold corrupt elections because democracy protests occurred against corrupt elections in other countries. Nor, are they likely to delay elections because this could also incite protests. After the Bulldozer Revolution, only a handful of countries in East Central Europe delayed elections over the next ten years, and none of these delays were based on governments' fears of Color-like behavior in their countries, but rather from legal discrepancies about the timing

of elections (e.g., Czech Republic 2010 and Uzbekistan 2007), repeat elections (e.g., Serbia 2003 and Moldova 2010), and factional power struggles (e.g., Ukraine 2007).<sup>4</sup> If anything, governments weary of protests taking place against planned elections in their own countries are likely to limit electoral fraud or undertake actions to better obscure it.

Governments are also not typically more likely to experience economic crises as a result of protests in other countries. The economic repercussions for countries in which protests occur do not usually rise to the level of crises while the spillover effects of economic crises are not usually immediate or universal (Dornbusch, Park and Claessens 2000).<sup>5</sup> Moreover, in some cases, governments with the economic means to do so have undertaken initiatives to strengthen their economies to prevent protests from occurring. Backed by oil-rich economies, the United Arab Emirates tried to prevent Arab Spring-like protests in the Emirates by cutting food prices, while Saudi Arabia committed to a multi-billion dollar spending increase to raise civil service salaries, create public-sector jobs, and build housing.<sup>6</sup>

Most democracy protests are also unlikely to inspire protests in other countries because they are generally not successful, and because their success typically depends on domestic processes that are not informative of the likely success of protests elsewhere. Almost two-thirds of democracy protests that took place between 1989 and 2011 attracted less than ten thousand participants at their single largest rally (a third attracted less than a thousand), and about the same fraction of protests ended in three days or fewer (Brancati 2016, 28). Moreover, in this period, less than 10% of protests forced governments to step down from power and less than 25% of them extracted political concessions from governments (107).

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<sup>4</sup>Information regarding the number of countries in which elections were delayed is based on nelda6 in the National Elections Across Democracy and Autocracy (NELDA) Dataset (v3) and the Global Elections Database.

<sup>5</sup>Between 1989 and 2011, GDP per capita growth was only 1 percentage point lower on average in countries where a democracy protest occurred one year after a protest compared to countries where a protest did not occur. This difference is statistically significant at the 0.05 level. However, inflation and unemployment were essentially unchanged. Figures calculated by the authors based on data from Brancati (2016).

<sup>6</sup>Glen Carey, "Saudi Spending Fuels Fastest Gulf Inflation: Arab Credit," *Bloomberg News*, 5 March 2013; "UAE Boosts Military Pensions, Seen Pre-empting Unrest," *Al Arabiya News*, 24 March 2011.

Conversely, about two-thirds of democracy protests in the period were repressed by military or police forces (122; 130-131).

Even successful protests are unlikely to inspire democracy protests in other countries because the success of these protests depends on domestic factors and the repressive capacity of states in particular. State repressive capacity is based on the size of the protests, with larger protests being harder to repress than smaller ones. It also depends on the size of a country's domestic security forces, with larger and better funded forces being more capable of repressing democracy protests than others. The willingness of these forces to repress protests, in turn, relies on a number of factors, including the existence of ideological or personality conflicts, kinship ties, succession rules, and so forth.

Moreover, as others have noted, protests in neighboring countries can increase the repressive capacity of states by leading autocrats to undertake initiatives that block the spread of protests (Bratton and van de Walle 1997; Beissinger 2007; Heydemann and Leenders 2011; della Porta and Tarrow 2012; Saideman 2012; Koesel and Bunce 2013; Danneman and Ritter 2014). A number of authoritarian regimes in East Central Europe cracked down on opponents, including civil society organizations and transnational activists promoting democracy and human rights after the Orange and Tulip Revolutions. Similarly, China stepped up measures after the Arab Spring to prevent democracy protests from occurring in China, including increased censorship, police patrols, and arrests of known activists, while the oil-rich states in the Middle East and North Africa increased spending.<sup>7</sup>

Countermeasures, such as these, we argue, are less likely to be important in explaining why democracy protests do not diffuse across countries than the factors already mentioned, because most democracy protests are small and of limited duration and not likely, therefore, to instill fear in or elicit a reaction from governments in other countries, just as they are not likely to provide much inspiration to activists in other countries to organize protests.

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<sup>7</sup>James Fallows, "Arab Spring, Chinese Winter," *The Atlantic*, September 2011.

Moreover, those states least likely to experience democracy protests are those most likely to have the ability to undertake measures to counter their spread. These are states that are economically prosperous and have the resources to increase public spending like the oil-rich monarchies of the Persian Gulf, as well as states that have strong and sophisticated repressive apparatuses like China.

Still, the fact that most democracy protests are poor models for other countries does not rule out the possibility that democracy protests spread to other countries because, as Weyland (2007, 2009) argues, the public lacks the time, information, and computational and financial resources to evaluate fully the likely success of protests in their own countries, and rely instead on cognitive shortcuts or heuristics that lead them to overestimate the odds of successful protests occurring in their countries. According to the availability heuristic, people make decisions based on the information most readily available to them, which is typically information that is striking and vivid, while according to the representative heuristic, they estimate the likelihood of an event occurring based on how much it resembles a prototypical case. Bounded rationality arguments still make similar predictions as those in which actors are fully rational, however, predicting, for example, that democracy protests are more likely to spread to other countries when they occur in salient and geographically and temporally proximate countries (Weyland 2007, 6).

Although we cannot rule out the possibility of bounded rationality theoretically, we are skeptical about its applicability to democracy protests. Specifically, we are skeptical of the assumption that people lack the necessary information needed to reliably predict the likelihood of successful protests in their own country. Citizens living in authoritarian states have a lot of information about their governments' likelihood of repressing protests based on their own personal experiences, the presence of non-state controlled forms of media, and the general restrictiveness of their countries' political and legal environments. It is also not obvious to us that were people to rely on the availability heuristic to evaluate the

likelihood of successful protests in their own country that they would decide to organize or participate in protests, since most protests are immediately repressed by governments and are unable to extract concessions from governments. People are also likely to discount the relevance of successful protests in neighboring countries since large protests that extract political concessions from governments are not the prototypical case. Moreover, it has not been shown experimentally or otherwise whether these heuristics, which explain individual behavior, apply to group decision-making (Osmani 2016).

Any apparent clustering of democracy protests, we argue, is likely due to commonalities among countries and not to diffusion. Commonalities arguments claim that when protests occur in two or more countries within a short period of time or in geographic proximity of each other, that it is not because protests in one country cause protests in another country to occur, but because the countries share certain things in common due to their temporal or geographic proximity that makes protests likely to occur in them independently of each other (Hale 2014). These include a decline in international oil prices or a spike in food prices, as in Europe in 1848 (Goldstone 1991; Berger and Spoerer 2001; Houle, Kayser and Xiang 2016) and the Middle East and North Africa at the beginning of this decade (Joffé 2011; Campante and Chor 2012); a similar electoral cycle marked by unpopular leaders, as in the Color Revolutions (Hale 2005); and a change in a regional security environment, as when the Soviet Union collapsed marking the end of the Cold War (Bunce and Wolchik 2013; Bratton and van de Walle 1997; Gunitsky 2014).

## **Analysis**

In order to evaluate the importance of diffusion processes to the outbreak of democracy protests in general, we examine statistically the correlation between the occurrence a democracy protest in one country and the prior occurrence of a democracy protest in a neighboring country. The analysis includes 183 countries between the end of the Cold War in 1989 and

the first year of the Arab Spring in 2011. This period encompasses three of the four waves of democracy protests, which are emphasized in the literature as diffusing across countries, and includes the internet era. Technological advancements in this era are believed to make diffusion more likely than in previous periods (Valenzuela, Arriagada and Scherman 2012).

The unit of analysis is the country-day. This allows us to determine whether a protest in one country occurs before that of another, and how much earlier. Most analyses of diffusion processes are coded at the country-year level so that causality is much more difficult to establish. The detailed nature of these data can also help us to distinguish among diffusion and commonalities explanations for any observed clustering of democracy protests in the data by identifying patterns in the ways in which democracy protests are clustered. While some patterns are consistent with both diffusion and commonalities arguments, as explained further in the next section, certain patterns are only consistent with diffusion arguments.

The use of the country-day as the unit of analysis results in a dataset with around 1.4 million observations, only a small proportion of which ( $N=289$ ) experiences the onset of democracy protests. The large number of observations in the analysis makes it more likely that whatever results we find will be statistically significant. At the same time, the small number of democracy protests that occurred between 1989 and 2011 make us less likely to find significant results. We are inclined to believe that the lack of significance we find in the subsequent analysis for the diffusion variables is not due to the relatively small number of democracy protests in the dataset for two reasons: first, other variables – such as elections – have a positive, large, and statistically significant effect on the probability of protest onset consistent with the models reported in Brancati (2016); and second, the same analyses using alternative measures of protests with more cases of protests are not significant either.

To ensure that the way in which we define neighbors does not drive our results (Zhukov and Stewart 2013), we define neighbors ( $n$ ) in two different ways. The first defines countries as neighbors if the *minimal* distance between them is either 50 km or 800 km. These distances

(or very similar ones) are commonly used to define neighbors in the diffusion literature. The 50 km category includes, but is not limited, to all contiguous countries.<sup>8</sup> The second defines two countries as neighbors if they belong to the same geographical region based on the UN Statistics Division’s designation of macro-geographical regions.<sup>9</sup> The term target ( $t$ ) refers to the country *to* which democracy protests might spread. Targets, if they experience protests, become neighbors in the following observation period.

In the analysis, we evaluate the likelihood of protests to occur in target countries when protests occur in neighboring countries within five different time intervals – three relatively short intervals (i.e., 45 days, 90 days, 120 days), one medium-length interval (360 days) and one long interval (election periods). (These results for the 360-days time interval are not statistically significant and reported in the Appendix, Table A1). The remaining results are discussed in the results section.) It is necessary to evaluate the likelihood of protests to occur within objective time intervals to avoid identifying a temporal clustering of democracy protests endogenously. Although the choice of these particular time intervals is arbitrary, we think that they are consistent with the theoretical predictions for diffusion.

We expect, for example, that if protests are to diffuse through demonstration effects that they should diffuse within a short to medium-length time period, as in the case of the 1848 Revolutions, the 1989 democracy protests, and the Arab Spring protests. Activists are most likely to be excited and energized by protests in neighboring countries immediately after they occur, and to rely on cognitive shortcuts to evaluate the odds of successful protests in their own countries (Weyland 2007, 2009). Neighboring countries and target countries are also likely to have more in common with each other in short time intervals as opposed to long ones, so that the former serve as better models for protests in the latter. We, expect,

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<sup>8</sup>Seventeen are island states and do not have any neighbors within 50 km of their borders. Two of these (Fiji and Mauritius) do not have any neighbors within 800 km of their borders.

<sup>9</sup>All 50 km neighbors are also 800 km neighbors, but only 70% of 50 km neighbors and 50% of 800 km neighbors belong to the same UN region (based on the final day of the sample, 31 December 2011).

meanwhile, that if protests diffuse as a result of transnational activists that they should do so over a medium-length to long period of time, as in the Color Revolutions, since activists need time to amass resources to support and train activists in other countries.

We introduce an additional time component into the analysis by restricting particular models to certain time periods, namely the internet era (24 October 1995 - onwards),<sup>10</sup> the period marking the end of communism (1989-1992),<sup>11</sup> and the first year of the Arab Spring protests (2011). The internet may facilitate the dissemination of information about protests to neighboring countries, thus making diffusion more likely, while most arguments about the diffusion of democracy protests are based on these two time periods.<sup>12</sup>

## Data and Measures

The data and measures we use in the analysis allow us to not only identify whether protests are more likely to occur when protests occur in neighboring country, but also to identify any conditions under which diffusion are more likely to occur. They also allow us to identify if protests are more likely to occur when protests occur in neighboring countries because protests in neighboring countries cause protests in other countries (diffusion), or because countries share particular features in common that make them both likely to experience protests independent of each other (commonalities). This is because only certain patterns in the data would be consistent with diffusion arguments, as Table 1 illustrates.

[Insert Table 1]

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<sup>10</sup>We define the internet era as the period after the Federal Networking Council passed a resolution defining the internet as a term in 24 October 1995.

<sup>11</sup>We identify 1989 as the starting point of the “end of communism” because it is the year the Berlin Wall fell, and 1992 as the endpoint because the Soviet Union dissolved in December 1991.

<sup>12</sup>As a robustness test, we interact neighbor protests with the target country’s internet access (using data on internet users per 100 people from the World Bank) to determine if protests are more likely to occur in target countries when these countries have more access to the internet. The results of this analysis are not significant. See Appendix (Table A2).

## *Democracy Protests*

Democracy protests are defined as any public demonstration in which the participants' primary demand is that countries adopt or uphold open and competitive elections (Brancati 2016). Democracy is understood here in a minimal sense so that protests about human rights, gender equality, the economy, and so forth are not included.<sup>13</sup> To measure democracy protests, we use the Brancati (2016) dataset, which identifies all democracy protests that fit this definition and that occur in independent countries between 1989 and 2011. In this period, 310 democracy protests occurred.<sup>14</sup> Protests for which there is some uncertainty as to whether they meet this definition are identified as "borderline protests" and are dropped from the analysis as a robustness test.<sup>15</sup>

Using these data, we created the following two measures. *Target democracy protest*, which is the outcome of interest, is a dichotomous variable coded 1 if a democracy protest began in a target country on a given day, and 0 otherwise. *Neighbor democracy protest*, which is the main explanatory variable, is a dichotomous variable coded 1 if on a given day, a protest took place in a neighboring country within the last 45, 90, 120, or 360 days, and 0 otherwise. For example, the outcome variable for Myanmar on 24 August 1998 is coded as 1, as a democracy protest began in that country that day. Beginning on 25 August, all of Myanmar's neighbors get the value of 1 for the independent variable *neighbor democracy protest*. Depending on the time window employed, this coding ends on 8 October 1998 (45 days later), 22 November (90 days), 22 December (120 days), or 19 August 1999 (360 days).

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<sup>13</sup>While others might define democracy and thus, democracy protests, in broader terms, our definition of democracy is based on features of political systems for which there is universal agreement that any democracy must contain at a minimum in order to be considered a democracy. For broader definitions, there is much less agreement. For more detailed information about the definition, cases, and coding procedures used, see Brancati (2016, pp. 5-9).

<sup>14</sup>Our analysis includes 289 protests because we drop two protests from the original dataset that occurred prior to their countries' independence according to the CShapes dataset (Weidmann and Gleditsch 2010), and all protests that broke out when another protest was ongoing in a country.

<sup>15</sup>A total of 27 protests are coded as borderline. Most of the Arab Spring protests are coded as borderline or are not coded as democracy protests at all.

To address the possibility that anti-regime contention, in general, is more likely to occur in target countries if democracy protests occur in neighboring countries, we replicated our analyses with three alternative measures of mass behavior that differ substantially from Brancati (2016) as they code all forms of anti-government behavior, including strikes and/or protests, that make political, but not necessarily democracy-related claims. The data used to construct these measures are: the GDELT Project; the Social, Political, and Economic Event Database (SPEED); and the Mass Mobilization Data (MMD) Project. Details regarding these data and measures are provided in the Appendix, Tables A5 through A7.<sup>16</sup>

To account for the possibility that democracy protests are more likely to occur in target countries the more protests take place in neighboring countries, and the larger these protests are, we also measure the number and size of protests that occur in neighboring countries. *Number of neighbor protests* is calculated as the total number of democracy protests that occurred in neighboring countries in the last 45, 90, 120, or 360 days. *Size of largest neighbor protest* is measured according to the number of people present at the single largest democracy protest in any neighboring country within the last 45, 90, 120, or 360 days. Size is divided into 5 categories of participants: (1) less than 1,000; (2) 1,000-10,000; (3) 10,000-100,000; (4) 100,000-1 million; and (5) 1 million or more. A zero indicates that no protest occurred in a neighboring country. Changes over time in the size of the largest protest are reflected in the coding.

### *Government Responses to Neighboring Protests*

Diffusion arguments suggest that democracy protests are more likely to occur in a target country if a protest in a neighboring country is not repressed by the government and is able to achieve its political goals. To determine whether this is the case, we construct two sepa-

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<sup>16</sup>GDELT: <http://www.gdeltproject.org/>; SPEED: <http://www.clinecenter.illinois.edu/data/event/speed/>; and MMD: <http://www.binghamton.edu/massmobilization/>. Accessed: 5 December 2017 and 10 January 2017.

rate measures of how neighboring governments respond to protests. *Neighbor protest success* is an ordinal variable indicating whether: (1) all democracy protests that occurred in a neighboring country within 45, 90, 120, or 360 days were accommodated by the government; (2) only some were accommodated; or (3) none were accommodated. No protests in any neighboring country is the baseline. An accommodation includes any political concession made to protesters, such as reforms to increase electoral competitiveness, correct electoral fraud, restore suspended or annulled elections, hold elections for unelected offices, or return elected governments to power, as well as the resignation of a country's chief executive (Brancati 2016, 136-146). An accommodation is only coded as such since the day after it was announced. In this period, only 5 concessions were clearly hollow or disingenuous and are dropped from the analyses as a robustness test.<sup>17</sup>

*Neighbor protest repression* is similarly measured. It is coded: (1) if all democracy protests that occurred in a neighboring country within the last 45, 90, 120, or 360 days were repressed by the government; (2) if only some were repressed; or (3) if none were repressed. No protests in any neighboring country is also the baseline. Repression refers to only acts of force by government military or police forces with the goal of ending the protests. Acts of force used in self-defense or to manage violent crowds are not included. Protests are only coded as repressed since the day after the repression began.

### *Neighbor Characteristics*

Diffusion arguments also suggest that whether or not protests spread to other countries depends on the characteristics of the country in which the protests first took place, especially its influentialness and similarity to target countries. The former affects the degree to which people in target countries are likely to be aware of protests in other countries, while the latter

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<sup>17</sup>They include two cases of unkept promises of reform (e.g., Haiti 2004 and Egypt 2011); one case of tangential reforms (e.g., Russia 2011-2012); and two cases of status quo reforms (e.g., Kuwait 1989-90 and Democratic Republic of Congo 1991).

affects the extent to which they are likely to believe that similar protests would be successful in their countries. According to diffusion arguments, the more influential the neighboring country and the more similar it is to the target country, the more likely protests are to diffuse. Commonalities argument are silent as to whether or not protests are more likely to occur in target countries when protests occur in influential neighbors, but suggest that protests should be more likely to occur in target countries the more similar neighboring and target countries are to each other in terms of factors likely to encourage democracy protests.

Our indicators of influentialness are based on four alternative measures: total gross domestic product (GDP); total population (in millions); total military expenditures; and total ground forces, measured as the number of active army personnel and government-controlled paramilitary forces in a country. All values for these measures are lagged one year. Higher GDPs, larger populations, greater military expenditures, and larger ground forces are indicative of greater influentialness. Data for the first three measures are based on the *World Development Indicators* (World Bank 2014), while data on the last are based on *The Military Balance* (1988-2011) (International Institute for Strategic Studies 1988-2011).

Using these four measures, we construct eight different indicators of influentialness – one indicator of absolute influence and one indicator of relative influence for each measure. The absolute measures capture the overall influentialness of a neighboring country in the world, while the relative measures capture the influentialness of a neighboring country vis-à-vis a target country. Our measures are based on the most influential neighbor, which allows us to address arguments that whether or not protests diffuse depends not on the influentialness of the first country that experiences a protest, but on whether or not a pivotal case experiences a protest.<sup>18</sup>

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<sup>18</sup>Bunce, Patel and Wolchik (2013) argue that the protests diffused in 2011, not because of the protests in Tunisia, but because of those in Egypt, since Egypt is more influential than Tunisia due to its size, the developed character of its opposition, and its close alliance with the United States, and because the conditions in Egypt more closely resembled those present in other neighboring states. They make a similar argument in the case of East Germany and protests in 1989.

To understand how these measures are calculated, consider the following example. *Neighbor population (absolute)* is measured in terms of the population of the largest neighboring country that had a democracy protest in the last 45, 90, 120, or 360 days. If no neighboring country had a democracy protest, this measure takes on the value of 0. The measure is then logged to account for non-linearities.<sup>19</sup> In contrast, *neighbor population (relative)* is defined as the population ratio between the largest n=neighboring country that had a democracy protest in the last 45, 90, 120, or 360 days, and that of the t=target country:  $\frac{population_n}{population_t}$ . Accordingly, a value of 1 indicates that both countries are equally influential; a value above 1 indicates that the neighboring country is more influential than the target country, and a value below 1 indicates that the neighboring country is less influential than the target country. A value of 0 indicates that no neighboring country had a democracy protest. The measure is logged so that the ratio is symmetric. We follow the same procedure to create the absolute and relative measures of *neighbor GDP*, *neighbor military spending* and *neighbor military personnel*.

To represent the similarity of target and neighboring countries, we construct four different indicators based on factors shown elsewhere to affect the occurrence of democracy protests – GDP per capita, population, democracy, and state repressiveness. A higher GDP per capita increases demands for democracy by fostering values of autonomy and self-expression according to modernization theories (Inglehart and Welzel 2009), and reducing income inequality according to redistributive arguments (Boix 2003). According to Brancati (2016), however, it reduces the likelihood of democracy protests by minimizing the effects of economic crises. Countries with larger populations are more likely to experience protests because they are generally more heterogenous than smaller countries. Both *GDP per capita (similarity)* and *population (similarity)* are measured using the *World Development Indicators*.

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<sup>19</sup>To account for zeros, we add 0.0001 before logging.

Democracy protests are less likely to occur in more democratic countries than in less democratic ones, even though individuals generally have greater freedom to protest in the former than in the latter, because there are fewer aspects of elections that are not open and competitive in the former than in the latter. However, protests still occur in democracies, particularly around threats to open and competitive elections, such as bans against certain parties and candidates, as well as coups d'état. We measure democracy with the Polity Index, which codes democracy in a minimal sense based on the independence of executive authority, the openness and competitiveness of executive recruitment, and the regulation and competitiveness of participation (Marshall and Gurr 2015). The index ranges from -10 (strong autocracy) to +10 (strong democracy).

At the same time, protests are less likely to occur in more repressive states because people are less likely to participate in protests if the odds of being hurt are higher and the likelihood of protests achieving their goals is lower. We measure state repressiveness using the Cingranelli and Richards' physical integrity rights (CIRI PIR) index, which codes physical rights on an 9-point scale based on the extent to which governments protect the populace against torture, political imprisonment, extrajudicial killings, and disappearances.<sup>20</sup> As in the case of the previous measures, for any given observation, the similarity measures take on the value of the most similar neighbor for each quantity of interest to address arguments that protests diffuse based not on first incidences, but pivotal cases.

Whenever there is no protest in a neighboring country, the similarity measures take on the value of 0. When there is a neighbor protest, we calculate the similarity indicators by first taking the ratio of each of these measures for the neighboring country in relation to the target country (as in the relative measures of influentialness), then logging the ratio to

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<sup>20</sup>We do not measure similarity in terms of military strength because in most cases, democracy protests are repressed by police (not military) forces, which the CIRI PIR index captures more accurately. In the calculation of the repressiveness variables, we invert the index's original scores so that higher values indicate a more repressive government. Thus, the index ranges from 0 (full) to 8 (no government protection against these actions).

make the distribution symmetric, and then taking the absolute value of the logged ratio. For example, in the case of population, the corresponding formula is  $\left| \log \left( \frac{\text{population}_n}{\text{population}_t} \right) \right|$ . In this way, the similarity measures take on the same value when  $A$  is the target and  $B$  is the neighbor, as when  $B$  is the target and  $A$  the neighbor. We then invert the values by subtracting them from the largest value that the above result takes. This simplifies the interpretation of the results, as larger values indicate that two countries are more similar. More importantly, were we not to invert the scores, having no protests would have the same value as having a protest in the most similar pair of countries. But, by inverting the scores, it has the same value as having a democracy protest in the most similar pair of countries.<sup>21</sup>

### *Additional Controls*

In addition to these measures, we also include in the analysis a control variable for election periods. We do not control for all factors that might affect whether or not protests occur within countries, such as nationalist sentiment, the urban landscape (i.e., central squares), economic crises, or corruption. Some of these factors, like nationalist sentiment and corruption, are very difficult to measure. Others are more easily measurable, but the factors themselves do not vary within years of countries (e.g., central squares), or the available estimates of them do not (e.g., population, corruption and economic crises). These factors are controlled for in the analysis using country-year fixed effects, as explained further below.

Election periods, however, do vary within years of countries. We measure *election periods* with an indicator variable coded 1 if a given observation fell within 30 days of a national

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<sup>21</sup>While it is not ideal that a value of zero corresponds to two conditions – no protests in either the target or neighboring countries and the most dissimilar pair of target and neighboring countries, we expect the likelihood of protests to be very similar in both. For all four of the similarity measures for 50 km neighbors, over 99 percent of the zeros for these measures are a result of no protests occurring. The same is true for three of the similarity measures (i.e., GDP per capita; population; and repressiveness) for 800 km neighbors. For the democracy similarity measure, about 2 percent or less of the zeros are a result of no protests occurring.

election in a given country (i.e., legislative or presidential election), and 0 otherwise.<sup>22</sup> Specifically, *election period* takes the value 1 if country  $n$  held a presidential or legislative election on day  $d$ , as well as the 30 following days. Democracy protests are more likely to occur around election periods because electoral fraud indicates to citizens that they are not alone in their opposition to the government and that, if they protest, others are likely to protest as well (Tucker 2007; Hyde and Marinov 2014; Kuntz and Thompson 2009; Svobik and Chernykh 2015; Beaulieu 2014). Elections also make the connection between a country's poor economic performance and its lack of democracy more salient (Brancati 2016). Although we do not report the results of this variable in the tables to conserve space, election periods are consistently a significant predictor of the likelihood of democracy protests to occur.

## Results

In order to analyze the potential diffusion of democracy protests, we first examine the temporal and spatial distribution of democracy protests in the post-Cold War period. Table 2 depicts the percentage of days between 1 January 1989 and 31 December 2011 on which a democracy protest broke out in a country depending on whether or not a democracy protest occurred in a neighboring country within the last 45, 90, or 120 days. These figures do not represent the total number of days on which democracy protests occurred in this period, which is much higher, only the number of days on which democracy protests *began*, since we are interested in the outbreak of democracy protests. Consistent with Boehmke (2009), we drop all days in which a protest was already ongoing in a country, as countries where a protest is already in place do not have the opportunity to have a new democracy protest begin.

[Insert Table 2]

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<sup>22</sup>The election data are based on the African Elections Database (Nunley 2004-2012), the Global Elections Database (Brancati 2007), and the Oxford series of election data handbooks (Nohlen, Krennerich and Thibaut 1999; Nohlen 2005; Nohlen and Stöver 2010).

The figures in the table provide some evidence of spatial clustering. Democracy protests, according to these figures, are 20-50% more likely to break out if a protest occurred in a neighboring country within the last 45, 90, or 120 days. The evidence for a temporal clustering of protests is slightly weaker. Democracy protests are less likely to occur for longer time intervals, but only for 800 km neighbors and UN regional neighbors, not for 50 km neighbors. The figures in this table represent aggregate trends and do not show the regions of the world and time periods in which democracy protests are clustered.

In order to visualize this information, we created a time-lapse video using iMovie. If a democracy protest occurred in a country in a given month, a solid black dot appears in the video within the borders of that country. The size of the dot is in proportion to the size of the protests. The dot remains solid as long as the protest is on-going. The dot changes to gray and becomes hollow for the 90-day period (approximately 13 weeks) after the protest ended. Where democracy protests are temporally and/or spatially clustered, the density of dots is higher. The time lapse-video is available online along with the replication materials from the authors. From this video, we provide two snapshots of the two periods in which democracy protests appear to be clustered – 1989-1992 around the end of communism in East Central Europe and West Africa, and 2011 in the Middle East and North Africa (see Figure 1). While protests seem to be geographically clustered in these two periods, there are also many countries that did not experience a protest even though their neighbors did.

[Insert Figure 1]

Since whatever clustering observed in the table and video may be due to neighboring countries having similar characteristics that dispose them to protests, and may not be significant when controlling for other factors, in the remainder of the paper, we run a series of models that examine more systematically whether democracy protests are temporally and spatially clustered, as well as which features, if any, of democracy protests and the countries

in which they occur are associated with this clustering. The models are estimated using ordinary least squares regression with fixed effects for country-years in order to control for any unexplained variance in countries over time.<sup>23</sup> Failing to include fixed-effects for country-years as we do, would misleadingly treat each day within a given year of a country as if it were an independent observation. The  $p$ -values are based on standard errors clustered by country.<sup>24</sup>

### *Protests in Neighboring Countries*

In the first set of models presented in Table 3, we examine whether or not a protest is more likely to occur in a target country when a protest occurs in a neighboring country located within 50 km or 800 km of the target country or in the same region as the target country in the last 45, 90 and 120 days. We also explore if the likelihood of a democracy protest to occur in a target country is associated with the number of democracy protests that occur in neighboring countries and the size of the largest protest.

[Insert Table 3]

As is evident from Table 3, a democracy protest is not significantly more likely to occur in a target country if at least one democracy protest occurred in a neighboring country located within 50 km or 800 km of the target country or the same region as the target country in the

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<sup>23</sup>We employ OLS rather than logit/probit specifications for three reasons. First, logit/probit specifications do not work well with fixed effects, especially if, as is the case here, there are few observations in which the outcome variable takes the value of 1. Second, OLS and logit/probit models produce very similar results when researchers are interested, as we are in this analysis, in estimating marginal effects rather than fitted probabilities Angrist and Pischke (2009, p. 102-7), especially when including fixed effects (Beck 2011). Third, logit/probit models work especially poorly when the model is misspecified (i.e., an irrelevant variable is included or a relevant one is excluded, even if that variable is uncorrelated with the explanatory variable of interest Angrist and Pischke (2009); Beck (2011, fn. 33).

<sup>24</sup>The standards errors are clustered by country to adjust for the fact that all observations for the same country across years may be correlated with each other.

last 45, 90, or 120 days. A protest is also not significantly more likely to occur in a target country regardless of the number of neighboring protests or the size of the largest protest.<sup>25</sup>

In order to determine if political protests of all types – and not just democracy protests as defined by Brancati (2016) – are more likely to occur in target countries following similar protests in neighboring countries, we repeated these analyses using three different measures of protests based on data from GDELT, SPEED, and MMD. As Tables A5 through A7 in the Appendix show, the results are substantively and statistically the same with the point estimates very small in magnitude and insignificant. The fact that the analyses using these datasets include a much larger number of protest events than the Brancati (2016) data and are also insignificant, strengthens our confidence that our previous null findings are not driven by the small number of democracy protests included in the analysis.<sup>26</sup>

In alternative models presented in Table 4, we repeat the analyses presented in the previous table for certain subsets of the data to test the robustness of our findings. In these analyses, we exclude cases of borderline protests and find no evidence that democracy protests are more likely to occur in target countries if protests occur in either 50 km or 800 km neighbors in the last 45, 90, or 120 days. We also restrict the analyses to the internet era (24 October 1995-), the end of communism (either 1989-1992 or 1989 only), and the Arab Spring, and find no evidence that democracy protests are more likely to occur in target countries if protests occurred in neighboring countries during any of these periods. Thus, even within the periods for which protests are widely believed to diffuse across countries, we do not find evidence of diffusion.

[Insert Table 4]

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<sup>25</sup>From this analysis, we cannot determine if protests are likely to be larger if protests occur in neighboring countries. However, preliminary evidence suggests that they would not. When a democracy protest occurs in a target country, the median size of a democracy protest in the target country (2=1,000-10,000) is the same regardless of whether or not a protest occurred in a neighboring country. See Appendix (Table A3).

<sup>26</sup>The actual values are: 249 (GDELT); 877 (SPEED); and 6, 211 (MMD).

In still other models presented in this table, we split the data into two samples – one for non-democracies (defined as those scoring 5 or less on the Polity IV index, or classified as “Autocratic” or “Electoral authoritarian” according to V-Dem’s ordinal polyarchy index) and one for democracies (scoring 6 or more on the Polity IV index or classified as “Minimally democratic” or “Democratic” by V-Dem’s ordinal polyarchy index) – to determine if protests are more likely to diffuse to non-democratic countries regardless of whether or not neighboring countries are democratic. As the models show, democracy protests are not significantly more likely to occur in authoritarian states if protests occur in neighboring states for any time interval or definition of neighboring states. To check if the results are driven by the use of linear probability models, we also tried conditional logit and random effects logit specifications. The conditional logit specifications also report null findings while the random effects models do not converge, probably due to the small number of cases in which the outcome variable takes the value of 1. See Appendix Table A8.

In other models, we consider the possibility of democracy protests diffusing across election periods. For these models, we conduct two separate sets of analyses. In the first, we replicate the models reported above, but include an interaction effect between a post-election period and the neighbor democracy protest variable (see Table A11 in the Appendix). In the second, we code a neighbor democracy protest as having occurred if there was a post-election democracy protest after the last election held in a neighboring country. In Table A12 we use the country-day as the unit of observation and limit the analysis to election-related democracy protests. In Tables A13 and A14, we employ the election as the unit of observation in order to determine whether, conditional on there being an election, an election-related protest is more likely to take place in a target country when there had been an election-related protest in a neighbor country.

Overall, in these models, we find weak evidence that the likelihood of a democracy protest to occur in a target country is significantly higher when a democracy protest occurs in a

neighboring country conditional on the occurrence of elections in target countries. Only a handful of the effects are significant and the few significant effects that we find are unlikely to be due to diffusion processes since they are not consistent with the expectations of diffusion arguments regarding the characteristics of neighboring protests that make protests more likely to diffuse, and because a close inspection of the data indicates that the cases responsible for the significant results are not those that diffusion scholars point to as examples of diffusion.

### *Government Responses to Neighbor Protests*

In Table 5 we explore if how governments in neighboring countries respond to democracy protests influences the likelihood of protests to occur in target countries. As is evident from the results in this table, democracy protests are not significantly more likely to occur in target countries regardless of whether or not governments repress democracy protests in neighboring countries or extend political concessions to them. The three indicators for success are not jointly significant in any of the models in this table according to Wald Tests, nor are any of the three indicators for repression.

[Insert Table 5]

### *Characteristics of Neighbors*

In the final set of models presented in Table 6, we examine if, as diffusion arguments suggest, democracy protests are more likely to occur in countries the more influential neighboring countries are in absolute and relative terms, and the more similar neighboring countries are to target countries. As is evident from the table, protests are not significantly more likely to occur in target countries regardless of how influential neighboring countries are or how similar they are to target countries. None of the measures of influentialness or similarity are significant for either 50 km or 800 km neighbors for any time interval examined.

[Insert Table 6]

## Conclusion

In contrast to prevailing views, our analysis finds little empirical evidence to support the notion that democracy protests diffuse across countries based on either full or bounded rationality. According to our analysis, democracy protests were not significantly more likely to occur shortly after democracy protests erupted in neighboring countries, no matter **the number OK** or size of the neighboring protests or whether the neighboring countries were influential or similar to the target countries in terms of various political and socio-economic features. Nor were they more likely to occur when democracy protests in neighboring countries were not repressed by their governments or were able to extract political concessions from them. These claims apply not only to the entire post-communist period, but also to the periods for which protests are widely believed to diffuse across countries – the fall of communism, the Color Revolutions, and the Arab Spring.

We cannot discern from our analysis whether these null results are driven by the fact that democracy protests do not diffuse across countries, or because the net effect of diffusion is zero as a result of governments taking countermeasures to prevent protests their spread. That said, we are inclined to believe that the results are not due to these countermeasures, as the countries least likely to experience democracy protests countries are those most likely to undertake measures to counter them. Moreover, as Table A15 shows, countries whose neighbors experienced a democracy protest in the last 360 days are not more likely to restrict civil liberties or reduce media freedom within the year.

Our analysis offers a valid and rigorous test of diffusion arguments. If democracy protests were to diffuse to other countries, we would expect to have seen evidence of it in the post-Cold War era because of the free flow of information in this era. Not only did we not detect any evidence of it in this period, but we also did not see any evidence of it for particular periods

within this era in which diffusion is widely believed to have occurred. Of course, the absence of evidence is not evidence of absence. However, the previous statistical analysis is extensive. We analyzed the potential for diffusion over five different time intervals (i.e., 45 days, 90 days, 120 days, 360 days, and elections periods); three different historical periods (i.e., the fall of communism, the internet era, and the Arab Spring); and three different definitions of neighbors (i.e., 50 km, 800 km, and UN-designated world regions). We also examined the potential for diffusion based not only on whether protests occurred in neighboring countries, but also on various characteristics of neighboring countries' protests, including their size, strategies, and effectiveness, and their similarity to other countries, using the only existing data on democracy protests, as well as data on related forms of protests as a robustness test.

Our analysis does not rule out the possibility that other aspects of protests, including their strategies, tactics, and techniques, diffuse across countries. Nor does it rule out the possibility that democracy protests inspire other forms of mobilization, although we do not find evidence that democracy protests inspire other types of politics protests or affect the size of protests in neighboring countries in any way. It also does not deny the possibility that democracy protests inspire protests in other countries in particular cases, or that certain individuals are inspired to participate in democracy protests by protests in other countries, only that these cases are not part of a general trend. Lastly, our analysis does not rule out the possibility that other international factors, such as exogenous economic shocks, influence the likelihood of democracy protests to occur in countries, only that democracy protests in other countries do not.

Knowing that democracy protests do not diffuse across countries in general is important because many studies of individual protests suggest, either implicitly or explicitly, that democracy protests diffuse more broadly. Moreover, democracy protests are one of the mechanisms by which democracy is believed to diffuse across countries. The absence of any evidence of protest diffusion suggests that if democracy diffuses, it does so through other

mechanisms, such as external support from neighboring countries in the form of foreign aid, membership in regional organizations, and so forth. Were neighboring governments to initiate democratic reforms in order to pre-empt protests from occurring against them, democracy protests could still account for the geographic and temporal clustering of democracy worldwide even if they do not diffuse across countries. However, since civil liberties and media freedom do not generally decline when protests occur in neighboring countries, this does not appear to be the case either.

**Table 1: Diffusion versus Commonalities Mechanisms**

<b>Quantities of Interest</b>	<b>Mechanism</b>	<b>Likelihood of Target Protest</b>
<i>Government Responses</i>		
Neighbor Protest Success	Diffusion	↑ success
Neighbor Protest Repression	Diffusion	↓ repression
<i>Influentialness</i>		
GDP (absolute)	Diffusion	↑ GDP
GDP (relative)	Diffusion	↑ GDP
Population (absolute)	Diffusion	↑ population
Population (relative)	Diffusion	↑ population
Military Spending (absolute)	Diffusion	↑ military spending
Military Spending (relative)	Diffusion	↑ military spending
Military Personnel (absolute)	Diffusion	↑ military personnel
Military Personnel (relative)	Diffusion	↑ military personnel
<i>Similarity</i>		
GDP per capita (similarity)	Diffusion; Commonalities	↑ similar GDP per capita
Population (similarity)	Diffusion; Commonalities	↑ similar population
Repressiveness (similarity)	Diffusion; Commonalities	↑ similar repressiveness
Democracy (similarity)	Diffusion; Commonalities	↑ similar democracy
<i>Time and Distance</i>		
Internet Era (24 October 1995-)	Diffusion	internet era
Fall of Communism (1989-1992)	Diffusion; Commonalities	fall of communism
Arab Spring (2010-2011)	Diffusion; Commonalities	Arab Spring
Time Intervals (45; 90; 120)	Diffusion; Commonalities	↓ time
Euclidean Distance (50 km; 800 km)	Diffusion; Commonalities	↓ distance
Geographic Region	Diffusion; Commonalities	same region


Table 2: Data Overview

protest in last...	50km neighbors		800km neighbors		UN region neighbors	
	no neighbor protest	neighbor protest	no neighbor protest	neighbor protest	no neighbor protest	neighbor protest
<b>45 days</b>	0.022% [258]	0.029% [24]	0.020% [234]	0.027% [55]	0.020% [239]	0.026% [50]
<b>90 days</b>	0.021% [242]	0.032%* [40]	0.019% [208]	0.027%* [81]	0.019% [220]	0.024% [69]
<b>120 days</b>	0.021% [236]	0.030% [46]	0.019% [196]	0.026%* [93]	0.019% [210]	0.024% [79]


*Note:* Probability that a protest will begin in a target country, conditional on a protest (not) having occurred in a neighboring country within the last 45, 90 or 120 days. The unit of observation is the country-day. Values in brackets indicate the number of observations with a democracy protest. The numbers for 50 km and 800 km neighbors do not add up to 289 because countries without neighbors are not included in the sample. (\*) indicates that the difference between the proportion of observations with and without protests is statistically significant at the 0.05 level.

**Figure 1:** Protests Diffusion Time-lapse Video Snapshots, 1989-2011

(a) 1989-1992



(b) 2011



*Note:* Solid dots indicate that a country experienced at least one democracy protest during the year, while hollow dots indicate that at least one neighboring country within 50 km experienced at least one such protest. Dot diameters are proportional to the square root of a protest's size. If a country (or its neighbors) experienced multiple protests during the year, only the largest one is recorded. Country boundaries correspond to those in force on 31 December 1989 and 31 December 2011, respectively.

Table 3: Number and Size of Democracy Protests, 1989-2011

	At Least One Neighbor Protest in Last		Total Number of Neighbor Protests in Last		Size of Largest Neighbor Protest in Last	
	45 days	90 days	45 days	90 days	45 days	90 days
<b>Baseline</b>	A. 50km Neighbors (166 countries; 3521 country-years; $\approx$ 1.27m obs.)					
<i>Neighbor Democracy Protest</i>	0.001 (0.922)	0.005 (0.366)	0.003 (0.541)	-0.001 (0.915)	0.004 (0.494)	0.002 (0.687)
<b>Baseline + Election</b>						
<i>Neighbor Democracy Protest</i>	0.000 (0.996)	0.005 (0.356)	0.004 (0.499)	-0.001 (0.873)	0.004 (0.485)	0.002 (0.683)
<b>Baseline</b>	B. 800km Neighbors (181 countries; 3866 country-years; $\approx$ 1.40m obs.)					
<i>Neighbor Democracy Protest</i>	0.001 (0.769)	0.003 (0.519)	0.001 (0.746)	0.001 (0.879)	0.003 (0.403)	0.001 (0.713)
<b>Baseline + Election</b>						
<i>Neighbor Democracy Protest</i>	0.001 (0.778)	0.002 (0.533)	0.002 (0.710)	0.001 (0.862)	0.003 (0.388)	0.001 (0.672)
<b>Baseline</b>	C. UN Region Neighbors (183 countries; 3912 country-years; $\approx$ 1.41m obs.)					
<i>Neighbor Democracy Protest</i>	0.001 (0.792)	-0.002 (0.658)	-0.003 (0.464)	0.005 (0.408)	0.000 (0.979)	-0.001 (0.880)
<b>Baseline + Election</b>						
<i>Neighbor Democracy Protest</i>	0.002 (0.683)	-0.001 (0.775)	-0.003 (0.550)	0.005 (0.324)	0.001 (0.825)	0.000 (0.990)

Note: OLS regression estimates. All specifications include country-year fixed effects. The  $p$ -values are based on standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. The unit of observation is the country-day. The coefficients in the table are multiplied by 100 for display purposes. (\*) indicates significance at the 0.05 level.

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Table 4: Diffusion of Democracy Protests: Alternative Samples

<i>Baseline</i>	50km Neighbors			800km Neighbors		
	45 days	90 days	120 days	45 days	90 days	120 days
<i>Excluding borderline protests</i>	0.003 (0.703)	0.006 (0.379)	0.003 (0.703)	0.003 (0.527)	0.004 (0.401)	0.003 (0.527)
<i>Internet era only</i>	0.006 (0.561)	0.011 (0.180)	0.006 (0.561)	0.007 (0.212)	0.004 (0.391)	0.007 (0.212)
<i>Fall of Communism (1989-1992)</i>	-0.016 (0.277)	-0.009 (0.577)	-0.016 (0.277)	-0.018 (0.093)	-0.006 (0.574)	-0.018 (0.093)
<i>Fall of Communism (1989 only)</i>	0.019 (0.748)	0.006 (0.919)	0.019 (0.748)	0.015 (0.744)	-0.004 (0.918)	0.015 (0.744)
<i>Arab Spring (2010-2011)</i>	0.007 (0.787)	-0.005 (0.827)	0.007 (0.787)	0.023 (0.230)	0.007 (0.728)	0.023 (0.230)
<i>Autocracies only (Polity IV)</i>	0.008 (0.536)	0.010 (0.269)	0.008 (0.536)	0.001 (0.908)	0.004 (0.541)	0.001 (0.908)
<i>Autocracies only (V-Dem)</i>	0.000 (0.984)	0.004 (0.657)	0.000 (0.984)	0.002 (0.778)	0.005 (0.475)	0.002 (0.778)
<i>Democracies only (Polity IV)</i>	-0.002 (0.845)	0.009 (0.205)	-0.002 (0.845)	0.005 (0.279)	0.005 (0.295)	0.005 (0.279)
<i>Democracies only (V-Dem)</i>	0.002 (0.685)	0.009 (0.172)	0.002 (0.685)	0.001 (0.802)	0.001 (0.823)	0.001 (0.802)
<b><i>Baseline + Election Control</i></b>						
<i>Excluding borderline protests</i>	0.006 (0.311)	0.006 (0.344)	0.006 (0.311)	0.003 (0.550)	0.003 (0.406)	0.003 (0.550)
<i>Internet era only</i>	0.009 (0.154)	0.010 (0.184)	0.009 (0.154)	0.003 (0.523)	0.004 (0.424)	0.003 (0.523)
<i>Fall of Communism (1989-1992)</i>	-0.007 (0.649)	-0.008 (0.594)	-0.007 (0.649)	-0.005 (0.670)	-0.007 (0.546)	-0.005 (0.670)
<i>Fall of Communism (1989 only)</i>	-0.026 (0.658)	0.006 (0.919)	-0.026 (0.658)	-0.030 (0.506)	-0.004 (0.916)	-0.030 (0.506)
<i>Arab Spring (2010-2011)</i>	-0.005 (0.797)	-0.010 (0.652)	-0.005 (0.797)	0.006 (0.734)	0.006 (0.730)	0.006 (0.734)
<i>Autocracies only (Polity IV)</i>	0.007 (0.345)	0.008 (0.336)	0.007 (0.345)	0.003 (0.669)	0.003 (0.589)	0.003 (0.669)
<i>Autocracies only (V-Dem)</i>	0.003 (0.724)	0.004 (0.652)	0.003 (0.724)	0.001 (0.830)	0.005 (0.471)	0.001 (0.830)
<i>Democracies only (Polity IV)</i>	0.005 (0.397)	0.009 (0.177)	0.005 (0.397)	0.005 (0.245)	0.005 (0.295)	0.005 (0.245)
<i>Democracies only (V-Dem)</i>	0.006 (0.283)	0.009 (0.176)	0.006 (0.283)	0.003 (0.340)	0.001 (0.839)	0.003 (0.340)

*Note:* OLS regression estimates. All specifications include country-year fixed effects. The  $p$ -values are based on standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. The unit of observation is the country-day. The coefficients in the table are multiplied by 100 for display purposes. (\*) indicates significance at the 0.05 level.

Table 5: Government Responses to Neighbor Protests, 1989-2011

<i>Baseline</i>	50km Neighbors (166 countries; 3521 c-years; $\approx$ 1.27m obs.)			800km Neighbors (181 countries; 3866 c-years; $\approx$ 1.40m obs.)		
	45 days	90 days	120 days	45 days	90 days	120 days
<u>Neighbor protest success</u>						
<i>All Successful</i>	-0.016 (0.134)	-0.008 (0.438)	-0.010 (0.341)	-0.003 (0.653)	0.005 (0.532)	0.001 (0.898)
<i>Some Successful</i>	-0.029 (0.034)*	-0.029 (0.028)*	-0.010 (0.644)	-0.026 (0.038)*	-0.001 (0.922)	-0.001 (0.934)
<i>None Successful</i>	0.006 (0.536)	0.010 (0.152)	0.007 (0.258)	0.004 (0.480)	0.002 (0.626)	0.002 (0.709)
<u>Neighbor protest repression</u>						
<i>All Repressed</i>	0.003 (0.775)	0.008 (0.307)	0.004 (0.630)	0.007 (0.261)	0.010 (0.090)	0.008 (0.167)
<i>Some Repressed</i>	-0.029 (0.055)	-0.023 (0.065)	-0.026 (0.025)*	-0.038 (0.000)*	-0.010 (0.462)	-0.017 (0.134)
<i>None Repressed</i>	-0.002 (0.911)	0.002 (0.888)	0.005 (0.642)	-0.005 (0.484)	-0.008 (0.207)	-0.006 (0.368)
<u>Election-related only</u>						
<i>Neighbor Democracy Protest</i>	0.003 (0.724)	0.004 (0.582)	-0.002 (0.740)	0.006 (0.332)	0.007 (0.163)	-0.000 (0.983)
<b><i>Baseline + Election Control</i></b>						
<u>Neighbor protest success</u>						
<i>All Successful</i>	-0.014 (0.182)	-0.007 (0.497)	-0.009 (0.354)	-0.003 (0.655)	0.004 (0.626)	0.000 (0.966)
<i>Some Successful</i>	-0.024 (0.080)	-0.027 (0.036)*	-0.011 (0.616)	-0.025 (0.038)*	0.000 (0.987)	-0.001 (0.942)
<i>None Successful</i>	0.004 (0.653)	0.010 (0.166)	0.007 (0.241)	0.004 (0.497)	0.002 (0.615)	0.002 (0.635)
<u>Neighbor protest repression</u>						
<i>All Repressed</i>	0.002 (0.824)	0.009 (0.275)	0.004 (0.554)	0.007 (0.263)	0.010 (0.087)	0.008 (0.149)
<i>Some Repressed</i>	-0.024 (0.107)	-0.020 (0.102)	-0.022 (0.057)	-0.037 (0.000)*	-0.008 (0.528)	-0.015 (0.166)
<i>None Repressed</i>	-0.003 (0.851)	0.001 (0.962)	0.004 (0.700)	-0.005 (0.465)	-0.009 (0.172)	-0.007 (0.332)
<u>Election-related only</u>						
<i>Neighbor Democracy Protest</i>	0.002 (0.840)	0.004 (0.609)	-0.002 (0.776)	0.005 (0.354)	0.008 (0.144)	0.001 (0.899)

Note: OLS regression estimates. All specifications include country-year fixed effects. The  $p$ -values are based on standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. The unit of observation is the country-day. The coefficients in the table are multiplied by 100 for display purposes. (\*) indicates significance at the 0.05 level.

Table 6: Neighbor Countries' Characteristics, 1989-2011

<i>Influentialness of neighbors</i>	50km Neighbors (151-165 countries; 2799-3494 country-years; 1.02-1.26m obs.)			800km Neighbors (161-181 countries; 2997-3866 country-years; 1.09-1.40m obs.)		
	45 days	90 days	120 days	45 days	90 days	120 days
<i>GDP (absolute)</i> (log)	0.000 (0.694)	0.000 (0.368)	0.000 (0.520)	-0.000 (0.997)	0.000 (0.836)	-0.000 (0.922)
<i>GDP (relative)</i> (log)	0.000 (0.915)	0.000 (0.604)	0.000 (0.653)	-0.000 (0.926)	0.000 (0.852)	-0.000 (0.980)
<i>Population (absolute)</i> (log)	0.000 (0.709)	0.000 (0.409)	0.000 (0.592)	-0.000 (0.984)	0.000 (0.765)	0.000 (0.997)
<i>Population (relative)</i> (log)	-0.000 (0.998)	0.000 (0.734)	0.000 (0.881)	-0.000 (0.853)	0.000 (0.769)	0.000 (0.968)
<i>Military spending (absolute)</i> (log)	0.000 (0.967)	0.000 (0.295)	0.000 (0.478)	-0.000 (0.998)	0.000 (0.739)	-0.000 (0.867)
<i>Military spending (relative)</i> (log)	0.000 (0.868)	0.001 (0.379)	0.001 (0.357)	0.000 (0.961)	-0.000 (0.913)	-0.000 (0.653)
<i>Military personnel (absolute)</i> (log)	0.000 (0.964)	0.000 (0.331)	0.000 (0.415)	0.000 (0.680)	0.000 (0.464)	0.000 (0.661)
<i>Military personnel (relative)</i> (log)	-0.000 (0.782)	0.000 (0.701)	0.000 (0.758)	0.000 (0.830)	0.000 (0.646)	0.000 (0.864)
<b><i>Similarity with neighbors</i></b>						
<i>GDP per capita (similarity)</i>	0.000 (0.930)	0.001 (0.537)	0.001 (0.552)	0.000 (0.952)	0.000 (0.550)	0.000 (0.637)
<i>Population (similarity)</i>	-0.000 (0.925)	0.000 (0.624)	0.000 (0.560)	-0.000 (0.857)	0.000 (0.723)	0.000 (0.748)
<i>Repressiveness (similarity)</i>	0.003 (0.601)	0.004 (0.338)	0.003 (0.285)	0.004 (0.273)	0.003 (0.290)	0.003 (0.242)
<i>Polity IV (similarity)</i>	0.003 (0.472)	0.004 (0.124)	0.003 (0.231)	0.002 (0.460)	0.002 (0.240)	0.002 (0.312)
<i>Polyarchy index (V-Dem) (similarity)</i>	0.001 (0.806)	0.001 (0.490)	0.001 (0.695)	0.001 (0.594)	0.001 (0.518)	0.001 (0.656)

Note: OLS regression estimates. All specifications include country-year fixed effects. The  $p$ -values are based on standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. The unit of observation is the country-day. The coefficients in the table are multiplied by 100 for display purposes. (\*) indicates significance at the 0.05 level.

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
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
## Appendix

**Figure 2:** Neighbor connectivities, 1989-2011


(a) 50 km neighbors



(b) 800 km neighbors



(c) UN region neighbors



*Note:* Lines indicate which countries are connected according to a the corresponding neighbor definition. Connections were plotted separately for January 1st of every year between 1989 and 2011, plus for all days in which there was a boundary change anywhere in the world. Country boundaries correspond to those in force on 31 December 2011. In panel (b), the lines going from the United States to Europe indicate the US' connection to the Soviet Union/Russia via Alaska.

Table A1: Diffusion of Democracy Protests: 360-day Time Lag, 1989-2011

<b>A. 50km Neighbors</b>		
<i>Baseline</i>	<b>dummy</b>	<b>sum</b>
<i>Neighbor Democracy Protest</i>	0.002 (0.796)	0.003 (0.570)
<b><i>Baseline + Election</i></b>		
<i>Neighbor Democracy Protest</i>	0.001 (0.819)	0.003 (0.626)
<b>B. 800km Neighbors</b>		
<i>Baseline</i>		
<i>Neighbor Democracy Protest</i>	0.002 (0.593)	0.002 (0.604)
<b><i>Baseline + Election</i></b>		
<i>Neighbor Democracy Protest</i>	0.004 (0.404)	0.002 (0.521)
<b>C. UN Region Neighbors</b>		
<i>Baseline</i>		
<i>Neighbor Democracy Protest</i>	-0.005 (0.327)	-0.002 (0.542)
<b><i>Baseline + Election</i></b>		
<i>Neighbor Democracy Protest</i>	-0.005 (0.356)	-0.002 (0.678)

*Note:* OLS regression estimates. Models replicate those of Table 3 but using a 360-day time lag. All specifications include country-year fixed effects. The  $p$ -values are based on standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. The unit of observation is the country-day. The coefficients in the table are multiplied by 100 for display purposes. (\*) indicates significance at the 0.05 level.

Table A2: Conditional Effect by Internet Connectivity

	50km Neighbors (175 c's; 2694 c-years; $\approx$ 0.98m obs.)			800km Neighbors (175 c's; 2942 c-years; $\approx$ 1.07m obs.)		
	45 days	90 days	120 days	45 days	90 days	120 days
<b>Baseline</b>						
<i>Neighbor Democracy Protest</i>	0.002 (0.855)	0.010 (0.276)	0.011 (0.154)	0.003 (0.678)	0.005 (0.349)	0.005 (0.392)
<i>Neighbor Democracy Protest</i> $\times$ % internet users	-0.000 (0.578)	0.000 (0.894)	-0.000 (0.591)	0.000 (0.601)	0.000 (0.979)	-0.000 (0.677)
<b>Baseline + Election</b>						
<i>Neighbor Democracy Protest</i>	-0.000 (0.997)	0.008 (0.330)	0.009 (0.178)	0.002 (0.738)	0.005 (0.383)	0.005 (0.388)
<i>Neighbor Democracy Protest</i> $\times$ % internet users	-0.000 (0.701)	0.000 (0.841)	-0.000 (0.660)	0.000 (0.538)	0.000 (0.991)	-0.000 (0.645)

Note: OLS regression estimates. % internet users measures the % of internet users in target country at the beginning of the year. All specifications include country-year fixed effects. The  $p$ -values are based on standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. The unit of observation is the country-day. The coefficients in the table are multiplied by 100 for display purposes. (\*) indicates significance at the 0.05 level.

**Table A3: Protest Size, Conditional on Neighbor Protest**

<i>Mean</i>	50km protest in last			800km protest in last		
	45 days	90 days	120 days	45 days	90 days	120 days
<i>Full sample</i>	2.11	2.11	2.11	2.11	2.11	2.11
<i>Protest in neighbor</i>	2.25	2.15	2.09	2.16	2.09	2.05
<i>No protest in neighbor</i>	2.08	2.08	2.09	2.09	2.12	2.13
<b><i>Median</i></b>						
<i>Full sample</i>	2.00	2.00	2.00	2.00	2.00	2.00
<i>Protest in neighbor</i>	2.00	2.00	2.00	2.00	2.00	2.00
<i>No protest in neighbor</i>	2.00	2.00	2.00	2.00	2.00	2.00
<b><i>Mode</i></b>						
<i>Full sample</i>	2.00	2.00	2.00	2.00	2.00	2.00
<i>Protest in neighbor</i>	2.00	1.00	1.00	2.00	2.00	2.00
<i>No protest in neighbor</i>	2.00	2.00	2.00	2.00	2.00	2.00

*Note:* The unit of observation is the protest. Note that the mean values are misleading because the size categories are not equally spaced: (1) 1,000 or less; (2) 1,000-10,000; (3) 10,000-100,000; (4) 100,000-1 million; (5) 1 million or more. (\*) indicates that the difference between the proportion of observations with and without neighbor protests is statistically significant at the 0.05 level. Even if neighbor protests do not increase the probability of a

protest occurring, they may increase the size of the protests that *do* occur. We could not examine this possibility directly, however, because this would have required a two-step model in which we first model the probability that a protest will occur, and then the protest's size, conditional on a protest occurring. Given the small number of democracy protests, however, the necessary logit/probit models do not converge. Nonetheless, this table shows that, conditional on a protest occurring in a country, there are few differences in protest size conditional on whether the protest had been preceded by a protest in a neighboring country within the last 45, 90 or 120 days, or not. With few exceptions, average protest size is "2", meaning that between 1,000-10,000 people participated, and this holds regardless of whether we use the mean, median, or modal protest size to measure the average.

Table A4: Main Results with the 2007 Venezuelan Protests

	At Least One Neighbor Protest in Last		Total Number of Neighbor Protests in Last		Size of Largest Neighbor Protest in Last	
	45 days	90 days	45 days	90 days	45 days	90 days
<i>Baseline</i>						
	A. 50 km Neighbors (166 countries; 3521 country-years; $\approx$ 1.27m obs.)					
<i>Neighbor Democracy Protest</i>	0.001 (0.922)	0.005 (0.366)	0.003 (0.541)	-0.001 (0.915)	0.004 (0.494)	0.002 (0.687)
<i>Baseline + Election</i>						
<i>Neighbor Democracy Protest</i>	-0.000 (0.993)	0.005 (0.364)	0.003 (0.508)	-0.001 (0.861)	0.004 (0.493)	0.002 (0.693)
<i>Baseline</i>						
	B. 800 km Neighbors (181 countries; 3866 country-years; $\approx$ 1.40m obs.)					
<i>Neighbor Democracy Protest</i>	0.001 (0.769)	0.003 (0.519)	0.001 (0.746)	0.001 (0.879)	0.003 (0.403)	0.001 (0.713)
<i>Baseline + Election</i>						
<i>Neighbor Democracy Protest</i>	0.001 (0.785)	0.002 (0.546)	0.001 (0.721)	0.001 (0.868)	0.003 (0.395)	0.001 (0.680)
<i>Baseline</i>						
	C. UN Region Neighbors (183 countries; 3912 country-years; $\approx$ 1.41m obs.)					
<i>Neighbor Democracy Protest</i>	0.001 (0.792)	-0.002 (0.658)	-0.003 (0.464)	0.005 (0.408)	0.000 (0.979)	-0.001 (0.880)
<i>Baseline + Election</i>						
<i>Neighbor Democracy Protest</i>	0.002 (0.686)	-0.001 (0.773)	-0.003 (0.549)	0.005 (0.326)	0.001 (0.826)	0.000 (0.991)

*Note:* OLS regression estimates. Models replicate those of Table 3 but include an additional protest that we added to the original data that occurred in Venezuela (2007). This protest was against amendments to the constitution on various issues, including policy changes, as well as political reforms, such as ending term limits and increasing the president's term of office. The protest arguably fits the definition of a democracy protest used in Brancati (2016) because the protesters framed much of their opposition to the referendum in terms of democracy, claiming that the amendments were an effort by Chavez to restrict political competition in the country. All specifications include country-year fixed effects. The  $p$ -values are based on standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. The unit of observation is the country-day. The coefficients in the table are multiplied by 100 for display purposes. (\*) indicates significance at the 0.05 level.

Table A5: Target Anti-regime Contention (GDELТ data), 1989-2011

	At Least One Neighbor Protest in Last			Total Number of Neighbor Protests in Last		
	45 days	90 days	120 days	45 days	90 days	120 days
<b>A. 50km Neighbors</b> (165-166 countries; 3364-3522 country-years; 1.22-1.28m obs.)						
<i>Neighbor Democracy Protest</i>	0.022 (0.079)	0.006 (0.512)	-0.002 (0.844)	0.020 (0.096)	0.005 (0.531)	0.001 (0.911)
<b>Baseline + Election</b>						
<i>Neighbor Democracy Protest</i>	0.022 (0.079)	0.006 (0.511)	-0.002 (0.844)	0.020 (0.095)	0.005 (0.530)	0.001 (0.911)
<b>Baseline (2011 excluded)</b>						
<i>Neighbor Democracy Protest</i>	0.010 (0.425)	0.004 (0.626)	-0.001 (0.843)	0.007 (0.466)	0.003 (0.658)	-0.001 (0.858)
<b>Baseline + Election (2011 excluded)</b>						
<i>Neighbor Democracy Protest</i>	0.010 (0.425)	0.004 (0.626)	-0.001 (0.842)	0.007 (0.465)	0.003 (0.658)	-0.001 (0.857)
<b>B. 800km Neighbors</b> (180-181 countries; 3694-3867 country-years; 1.34-1.40m obs.)						
<i>Neighbor Democracy Protest</i>	0.009 (0.150)	0.005 (0.294)	0.005 (0.362)	0.011 (0.067)	0.005 (0.319)	0.003 (0.425)
<b>Baseline + Election</b>						
<i>Neighbor Democracy Protest</i>	0.009 (0.150)	0.005 (0.295)	0.005 (0.363)	0.011 (0.066)	0.005 (0.320)	0.003 (0.426)
<b>Baseline (2011 excluded)</b>						
<i>Neighbor Democracy Protest</i>	0.003 (0.666)	0.004 (0.342)	0.001 (0.818)	0.003 (0.651)	0.003 (0.475)	0.001 (0.782)
<b>Baseline + Election (2011 excluded)</b>						
<i>Neighbor Democracy Protest</i>	0.003 (0.667)	0.004 (0.343)	0.001 (0.819)	0.003 (0.650)	0.003 (0.476)	0.001 (0.783)

*Note:* OLS regression estimates. Models replicate those of Table 3 but identify protests using GDELТ data. All specifications include country-year fixed effects. The  $p$ -values are based on standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. The unit of observation is the country-day. The coefficients in the table are multiplied by 100 for display purposes. (\*) indicates significance at the 0.05 level.

**Definition (protest):** a demonstration or rally demanding either a change in institutions (1414), a change in regimes or leadership (1411) or the expansion and protection of rights (1413) in which the recipient actor was the government and the initiator was a domestic actor. **Coverage:** 1979-2011. **Sources:** print, broadcast, and web news media, multiple languages. See: GDELТ, <http://www.gdelтproject.org/>. Date Accessed: 10 January 2017.

Note that we have serious reservations regarding the quality of these data: first, the data coverage is not consistent over time, with far more coverage of events for later years perhaps due to the increasing availability of web sources. For this reason, we excluded the year 2011 from some of the models above. second, a careful inspection of the data reveals that many democracy protests, which would fall under the category of anti-regime contention, are not included in the GDELТ data.

Table A6: Target Anti-regime Contention (SPEED data), 1989-2005

	At Least One Neighbor Protest in Last			Total Number of Neighbor Protests in Last		
	45 days	90 days	120 days	45 days	90 days	120 days
<b>A. 50km Neighbors</b> (157 countries; 2534 country-years; $\approx$ 0.92m obs.)						
<i>Neighbor Democracy Protest</i>	-0.003 (0.842)	0.004 (0.766)	-0.002 (0.897)	0.007 (0.634)	0.013 (0.275)	0.009 (0.424)
<b>Baseline + Election</b>						
<i>Neighbor Democracy Protest</i>	-0.003 (0.831)	0.004 (0.782)	-0.002 (0.888)	0.007 (0.637)	0.013 (0.281)	0.009 (0.427)
<b>B. 800km Neighbors</b> (171 countries; 2772 country-years; $\approx$ 1.01m obs.)						
<i>Neighbor Democracy Protest</i>	-0.002 (0.880)	-0.013 (0.152)	-0.009 (0.267)	0.003 (0.680)	0.004 (0.539)	0.003 (0.642)
<b>Baseline + Election</b>						
<i>Neighbor Democracy Protest</i>	-0.002 (0.863)	-0.014 (0.148)	-0.009 (0.265)	0.003 (0.684)	0.004 (0.544)	0.003 (0.646)

*Note:* OLS regression estimates. Models replicate those of Table 3 but identify protests using SPEED data. All specifications include country-year fixed effects. The  $p$ -values are based on standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. The unit of observation is the country-day. The coefficients in the table are multiplied by 100 for display purposes. (\*) indicates significance at the 0.05 level.

**Definition (protest):** a demonstration or strike organized by a non-governmental actor (`EXP_TYPE` = 8 (meaning a demonstration/march or a strike) and `INI_TYPE` = 1). **Sources:** News media. **Coverage:** 1946-2005. See: Social, Political, and Economic Event Database (SPEED), <http://www.clinecenter.illinois.edu/data/event/speed/>. Date Accessed: 5 December 2017.

**Table A7: Target Anti-government Contention (Mass Mobilization Data), 1990-2011**

	At Least One Neighbor Protest in Last			Total Number of Neighbor Protests in Last		
	45 days	90 days	120 days	45 days	90 days	120 days
<b>A. 50km Neighbors</b> (157 countries; 3210 country-years; $\approx$ 1.16m obs.)						
<i>Neighbor Democracy Protest</i>	0.007 (0.769)	-0.021 (0.441)	-0.026 (0.361)	0.036 (0.050)	-0.002 (0.909)	-0.011 (0.501)
<i>Baseline + Election</i>						
<i>Neighbor Democracy Protest</i>	0.006 (0.779)	-0.022 (0.438)	-0.027 (0.356)	0.035 (0.055)	-0.002 (0.899)	-0.011 (0.502)
<b>B. 800km Neighbors</b> (164 countries; 3364 country-years; $\approx$ 1.22m obs.)						
<i>Neighbor Democracy Protest</i>	0.024 (0.228)	-0.038 (0.303)	-0.026 (0.521)	0.022 (0.056)	-0.001 (0.955)	-0.005 (0.607)
<i>Baseline + Election</i>						
<i>Neighbor Democracy Protest</i>	0.024 (0.237)	-0.037 (0.314)	-0.024 (0.550)	0.021 (0.065)	-0.001 (0.938)	-0.005 (0.606)

*Note:* OLS regression estimates. Models replicate those of Table 3 but identify protests using Mass Mobilization data (Clark and Regan 2015). All specifications include country-year fixed effects. The  $p$ -values are based on standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. The unit of observation is the country-day. The coefficients in the table are multiplied by 100 for display purposes. (\*) indicates significance at the 0.05 level.

**Definition (protest):** a gathering of 50 or more people making demands related to political behavior or processes. **Coverage:** 1990 and 2014. **Sources:** News media and country-specific materials. See: Mass Mobilization Data Project (MMD). <http://www.binghamton.edu/massmobilization/>, Date Accessed: 20 May 2018.

**Table A8: Democracy Protests, 1989-2011: Conditional Logit Specifications**

	50km Neighbors (166 c's; 3912 c-years; $\approx$ 1.27m obs.)			800km Neighbors (181 c's; 3912 c-years; $\approx$ 1.40m obs.)		
	45 days	90 days	120 days	45 days	90 days	120 days
<b>Baseline</b>						
<i>Neighbor Democracy Protest</i>	0.027 (0.914)	0.183 (0.392)	0.117 (0.577)	0.056 (0.759)	0.108 (0.522)	0.061 (0.721)
<b>Baseline + Election Control</b>						
<i>Neighbor Democracy Protest</i>	-0.217 (0.421)	0.095 (0.685)	0.056 (0.805)	-0.022 (0.910)	0.108 (0.555)	0.100 (0.586)
<b>Election Interaction</b>						
<i>Neighbor Democracy Protest</i>	-0.141 (0.649)	0.159 (0.532)	0.004 (0.986)	-0.047 (0.831)	0.120 (0.542)	0.069 (0.725)
<i>Neighbor Democracy Protest</i> $\times$ <i>Election</i>	-0.241 (0.644)	-0.273 (0.555)	0.206 (0.640)	0.106 (0.791)	-0.059 (0.871)	0.151 (0.667)
<i>Election</i>	2.744 (0.000)*	2.748 (0.000)*	2.671 (0.000)*	2.682 (0.000)*	2.720 (0.000)*	2.657 (0.000)*

*Note:* Conditional logit estimates. All specifications include country-year fixed effects. The  $p$ -values are in parentheses. The unit of observation is the country-day. All country-years with no variation in the explanatory or the dependent variables are dropped from the analysis. (\*) indicates significance at the 0.05 level.

**Table A9: Data Overview: Post-election periods only**

protest in last...	50km neighbors		800km neighbors		UN region neighbors	
	no neighbor protest	neighbor protest	no neighbor protest	neighbor protest	no neighbor protest	neighbor protest
<b>45 days</b>	0.276% [86]	0.453% [10]	0.242% [77]	0.409% [21]	0.242% [79]	0.411% [19]
<b>90 days</b>	0.271% [82]	0.439% [14]	0.243% [71]	0.351% [27]	0.241% [73]	0.363% [25]
<b>120 days</b>	0.263% [78]	0.477% [18]	0.236% [66]	0.356% [32]	0.238% [69]	0.351% [29]

*Note:* Probability that a protest will begin in a target country within 30 days of an election, conditional on a protest (not) having occurred in a neighboring country within the last 45, 90 or 120 days. The unit of observation is the country-day. Values in brackets indicate the number of observations with a democracy protest. The total number of democracy protests for 50 km and 800 km neighbors may vary because countries without neighbors are not included in the sample. (\*) indicates that the difference between the proportion of observations with and without protests is statistically significant at the 0.05 level.

Table A10: Data Overview: Non-election periods only

protest in last...	50km neighbors		800km neighbors		UN region neighbors	
	no neighbor protest	neighbor protest	no neighbor protest	neighbor protest	no neighbor protest	neighbor protest
<b>45 days</b>	0.015% [172]	0.017% [14]	0.014% [157]	0.017% [34]	0.013% [160]	0.017% [31]
<b>90 days</b>	0.014% [160]	0.021% [26]	0.013% [137]	0.018%* [54]	0.013% [147]	0.016% [44]
<b>120 days</b>	0.015% [158]	0.019% [28]	0.013% [130]	0.017% [61]	0.013% [141]	0.015% [50]

*Note:* Probability that a protest will begin in a target country outside of a 30-day post-election window, conditional on a protest (not) having occurred in a neighboring country within the last 45, 90 or 120 days. The unit of observation is the country-day. Values in brackets indicate the number of observations with a democracy protest. The total number of democracy protests for 50 km and 800 km neighbors may vary because countries without neighbors are not included in the sample. (\*) indicates that the difference between the proportion of observations with and without protests is statistically significant at the 0.05 level.

Table A11: Interaction between Protests and Elections, 1989-2011

<i>Baseline</i>	50km Neighbors (183 c's; 3521 c-years; $\approx$ 1.27m obs.)			800km Neighbors (183 c's; 3866 c-years; $\approx$ 1.40m obs.)		
	45 days	90 days	120 days	45 days	90 days	120 days
<i>Neighbor Democracy Protest</i>	-0.004 (0.527)	0.001 (0.778)	-0.002 (0.692)	-0.003 (0.496)	-0.000 (0.944)	-0.001 (0.717)
<i>Neighbor Democracy Protest</i> $\times$ <i>Election</i>	0.153 (0.273)	0.152 (0.223)	0.209 (0.070)	0.160 (0.122)	0.105 (0.221)	0.119 (0.146)
<i>Election</i>	0.255 (0.000)*	0.251 (0.000)*	0.242 (0.000)*	0.223 (0.000)*	0.223 (0.000)*	0.216 (0.000)*
<b><i>Sum of neighbor protests</i></b>						
<i>Neighbor Democracy Protests</i> (sum)	-0.005 (0.416)	-0.000 (0.916)	-0.003 (0.480)	-0.004 (0.283)	-0.001 (0.719)	-0.002 (0.587)
<i>Neighbor Democracy Protests</i> (sum) $\times$ <i>Election</i>	0.145 (0.282)	0.158 (0.172)	0.163 (0.098)	0.178 (0.061)	0.153 (0.046)*	0.114 (0.077)
<i>Election</i>	0.256 (0.000)*	0.249 (0.000)*	0.245 (0.000)*	0.217 (0.000)*	0.207 (0.000)*	0.210 (0.000)*
<b><i>Neighbor rotest size</i></b>						
<i>Neighbor Democracy Protest</i> (size)	-0.001 (0.634)	0.000 (0.917)	-0.001 (0.525)	-0.001 (0.614)	0.000 (0.954)	-0.000 (0.848)
<i>Neighbor Democracy Protest</i> (size) $\times$ <i>Election</i>	0.013 (0.765)	0.016 (0.696)	0.029 (0.417)	0.035 (0.342)	0.015 (0.608)	0.019 (0.486)
<i>Election</i>	0.263 (0.000)*	0.262 (0.000)*	0.257 (0.000)*	0.233 (0.000)*	0.237 (0.000)*	0.234 (0.000)*
<b><i>Neighbor protest success</i></b>						
<i>All Successful</i>	-0.009 (0.422)	-0.000 (0.969)	-0.003 (0.763)	-0.005 (0.443)	0.003 (0.652)	-0.001 (0.917)
<i>Some Successful</i>	-0.024 (0.082)	-0.024 (0.076)	-0.004 (0.853)	-0.030 (0.002)*	-0.008 (0.450)	-0.004 (0.702)
<i>None Successful</i>	-0.003 (0.654)	0.002 (0.710)	-0.002 (0.701)	-0.001 (0.830)	-0.001 (0.906)	-0.002 (0.718)
<i>All Successful</i> $\times$ <i>Election</i>	-0.261 (0.000)*	-0.258 (0.000)*	-0.248 (0.000)*	0.064 (0.658)	0.028 (0.825)	0.044 (0.717)
<i>Some Successful</i> $\times$ <i>Election</i>		-0.216 (0.000)*	-0.235 (0.000)*	0.246 (0.540)	0.406 (0.252)	0.113 (0.583)
<i>None Successful</i> $\times$ <i>Election</i>	0.255 (0.137)	0.291 (0.068)	0.398 (0.008)*	0.190 (0.111)	0.108 (0.251)	0.152 (0.088)
<i>Election</i>	0.255 (0.000)*	0.251 (0.000)*	0.242 (0.000)*	0.222 (0.000)*	0.223 (0.000)*	0.216 (0.000)*
<b><i>Neighbor protest repression</i></b>						
<i>All Repressed</i>	-0.003 (0.769)	0.003 (0.701)	-0.001 (0.858)	0.002 (0.793)	0.006 (0.265)	0.005 (0.329)
<i>Some Repressed</i>	-0.023 (0.120)	-0.016 (0.193)	-0.019 (0.102)	-0.033 (0.000)*	-0.013 (0.294)	-0.016 (0.150)
<i>None Repressed</i>	-0.006 (0.597)	0.000 (0.964)	-0.002 (0.796)	-0.008 (0.226)	-0.009 (0.113)	-0.011 (0.108)
<i>All Repressed</i> $\times$ <i>Election</i>	0.172 (0.320)	0.242 (0.152)	0.219 (0.126)	0.225 (0.048)*	0.139 (0.132)	0.110 (0.204)
<i>Some Repressed</i> $\times$ <i>Election</i>	-0.211 (0.000)*	-0.220 (0.000)*	-0.213 (0.000)*	-0.196 (0.000)*	0.186 (0.538)	0.038 (0.855)
<i>None Repressed</i> $\times$ <i>Election</i>	0.116 (0.703)	0.001 (0.997)	0.226 (0.334)	0.089 (0.562)	0.030 (0.815)	0.153 (0.248)
<i>Election</i>	0.255 (0.000)*	0.251 (0.000)*	0.242 (0.000)*	0.222 (0.000)*	0.223 (0.000)*	0.216 (0.000)*

Note: OLS regression estimates. Effect of neighbor protest on the probability of observing a protest in a target country, conditional on whether there had been an election in the target country in the previous 30 days. All specifications include country-year fixed effects. The  $p$ -values are based on standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. The unit of observation is the country-day. The coefficients in the table are multiplied by 100 for display purposes. (\*) indicates significance at the 0.05 level.

**Table A12: Interaction between Protests and Elections, 1989-2011: Election-Related Protests (in Neighbor) Only**

	50km Neighbors (157 c's; 3210 c-years; $\approx$ 1.16m obs.)			800km Neighbors (164 c's; 3364 c-years; $\approx$ 1.22m obs.)		
	45 days	90 days	120 days	45 days	90 days	120 days
<b>Baseline</b>						
<i>Neighbor Democracy Protest</i>	0.003 (0.724)	0.004 (0.582)	-0.002 (0.740)	0.006 (0.332)	0.007 (0.163)	-0.000 (0.983)
<b>Baseline + Election Control</b>						
<i>Neighbor Democracy Protest</i>	0.002 (0.840)	0.004 (0.609)	-0.002 (0.776)	0.005 (0.354)	0.008 (0.144)	0.001 (0.899)
<b>Election Interaction</b>						
<i>Neighbor Democracy Protest</i>	-0.004 (0.490)	-0.005 (0.337)	-0.010 (0.083)	-0.001 (0.862)	0.001 (0.881)	-0.005 (0.368)
<i>Neighbor Democracy Protest</i> $\times$ <i>Election</i>	0.194 (0.326)	0.320 (0.095)	0.291 (0.079)	0.226 (0.081)	0.267 (0.027)*	0.203 (0.059)
<i>Election</i>	0.257 (0.000)*	0.246 (0.000)*	0.245 (0.000)*	0.226 (0.000)*	0.211 (0.000)*	0.215 (0.000)*

*Note:* OLS regression estimates. Effect of *election-related* neighbor protests on the probability of observing a protest in a target country. All specifications include country-year fixed effects. The  $p$ -values are based on standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. The unit of observation is the country-day. The coefficients in the table are multiplied by 100 for display purposes. (\*) indicates significance at the 0.05 level.

Table A13: Election-related Protest in Last Election in Neighbor, 1989-2011

(a) <i>Logit, country REs</i>	50km Neighbors			800km Neighbors		
	dummy	sum	size	dummy	sum	size
<i>Neighbor Democracy Protest</i> ( <i>last election</i> )	0.636 (0.050)	0.453 (0.029)*	0.232 (0.084)	0.384 (0.192)	0.324 (0.009)*	0.235 (0.030)*
<u>Protest success</u>						
<i>All Successful</i>	0.252 (0.522)			0.201 (0.564)		
<i>Some Successful</i>	1.484 (0.003)*			0.706 (0.075)		
<i>None Successful</i>	-0.172 (0.797)			-0.719 (0.255)		
<u>Government repression</u>						
<i>All Repressed</i>	0.592 (0.095)			0.418 (0.208)		
<i>Some Repressed</i>	2.352 (0.006)*			0.774 (0.100)		
<i>None Repressed</i>	-0.160 (0.843)			-0.578 (0.402)		
<b>(b) LPM, country REs</b>						
<i>Neighbor Democracy Protest</i> ( <i>last election</i> )	0.040 (0.136)	0.033 (0.199)	0.012 (0.305)	0.017 (0.415)	0.027 (0.116)	0.014 (0.148)
<u>Protest success</u>						
<i>All Successful</i>	0.010 (0.764)			0.008 (0.737)		
<i>Some Successful</i>	0.145 (0.036)*			0.042 (0.244)		
<i>None Successful</i>	-0.020 (0.603)			-0.043 (0.140)		
<u>Government repression</u>						
<i>All Repressed</i>	0.047 (0.136)			0.030 (0.281)		
<i>Some Repressed</i>	0.230 (0.256)			0.036 (0.498)		
<i>None Repressed</i>	-0.006 (0.794)			-0.025 (0.242)		

*Note:* The outcome variable is *democracy protest* within 30 days after an election. Panel (a) reports logit estimates with country random effects. Unlike in our previous models, we are able to analyze the data using logistic regression because there are not as many cases of non-protests in these data since elections are the unit of analysis as opposed to country-day. By way of comparison, in panel (b) we nonetheless also report the OLS models with country fixed effects. The unit of observation is the election. The  $p$ -values are based on standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. (\*) indicates significance at the 0.05 level.

**Findings:** An election-related democracy protest is not significantly more likely to occur in a target country within 30 days of an election (i.e., election day or 29 days afterwards) if an election-related protest occurred within 30 days (i.e., election day or 29 days afterwards) of at least one neighboring country's last elections in all but a handful of models using three different measures of election-related protests in the target countries, three different measures of neighbors (50 km and 800 km) and region (not shown), and two different estimation techniques.

Table A14: Election-related Protest in Last Election in Neighbor, 2000-2005 only


(a) <i>Logit, country REs</i>	50km Neighbors			800km Neighbors		
	<i>dummy</i>	<i>sum</i>	<i>size</i>	<i>dummy</i>	<i>sum</i>	<i>size</i>
<i>Neighbor Democracy Protest</i> <i>(last election)</i>	0.943 (0.382)	0.239 (0.650)	0.120 (0.708)	-0.582 (0.328)	-0.089 (0.794)	-0.095 (0.676)
<u>Protest success</u>						
<i>All Successful</i>	0.494 (0.680)			-0.970 (0.171)		
<i>Some Successful</i>	3.996 (0.047)*			0.218 (0.802)		
<i>None Successful</i>	-1.449 (0.457)			-0.690 (0.630)		
<u>Government repression</u>						
<i>All Repressed</i>	1.271 (0.381)			-0.212 (0.740)		
<i>Some Repressed</i>	-760.869 (1.000)			-48.826 (1.000)		
<i>None Repressed</i>	-0.758 (0.859)			-1.484 (0.341)		
<b>(b) <i>LPM, country REs</i></b>						
<i>Neighbor Democracy Protest</i> <i>(last election)</i>	0.065 (0.584)	0.027 (0.831)	0.017 (0.668)	-0.019 (0.884)	0.005 (0.960)	-0.003 (0.931)
<u>Protest success</u>						
<i>All Successful</i>	0.058 (0.682)			-0.014 (0.904)		
<i>Some Successful</i>	0.319 (0.123)			0.147 (0.251)		
<i>None Successful</i>	0.016 (0.680)			-0.018 (0.703)		
<u>Government repression</u>						
<i>All Repressed</i>	0.100 (0.497)			-0.002 (0.988)		
<i>Some Repressed</i>	0.138 (0.468)			-0.113 (0.540)		
<i>None Repressed</i>	-0.002 (0.979)			-0.084 (0.484)		

*Note:* The outcome variable is *democracy protest* on 30 days after election. Sample is restricted to 2000-2005. Panel (a) reports logit estimates with country random effects. Unlike in our previous models, we are able to analyze the data using logistic regression because there are not as many cases of non-protests in these data since elections are the unit of analysis as opposed to country-day. By way of comparison, in panel (b) we nonetheless also report the OLS models with country fixed effects. The unit of observation is the election. The *p*-values are based on standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. (\*) indicates significance at the 0.05 level.

### Results Comparison of Table A11 and Table A13:

The set up of the two tables differs in three ways: First, the Table A11 models include all democracy protests while the Table A13 models include only election-related democracy protests. However, in practice, this is not an important difference since all but one democracy protest that occurred in a target country within 30 days of an election is also election-related. Second, the models in Table A13 include election-related protests that occurred (a) prior to elections and (b) over a much wider span of time than the models in Table A11. Third, in Table A13 the unit of analysis is the election, while in Table A11, it is the country-day, drastically increasing the number of observations.

In any case, neither table provides much evidence that the relationship between democracy protests in target countries and neighboring countries is conditional on elections. In Table A13, most of the statistically significant results are *negative* rather than positive. In Table A11, some of the results are statistically significant, but the effect is substantively small. See graphs.



Despite these results, we are reluctant to draw any conclusions from these results that neighboring protests increase the likelihood of democracy protests in target countries around election periods. First, the patterns in government responses to neighboring countries' protests are either not fully consistent or not consistent at all with the expectations of diffusion theories. According to diffusion scholars, democracy protests should be more likely to occur in target countries when neighboring protests are successful (i.e., extract concessions from governments), and are not repressed. However, the likelihood of protests occurring in target countries is not consistently greater when more protests are successful than fewer protests, or when fewer protests are repressed than when more are repressed. See graphs.

Second, Table A14 shows that the results of Table A13 do not change if we focus on the 2000-2005 period, which is the period for which the qualitative evidence suggesting that protests diffuse across elections via transnational actors is strongest. Third, a close inspection of the data indicates that the specific cases that diffusion scholars point to as examples of diffusion, such as the Orange Revolution (2004), fit the findings, but for the wrong neighbors. The Orange Revolution, for example, is a case of a democracy protest occurring 30 days after an election when a democracy protest occurred in a neighboring country 30 days after its election. But, the neighbor responsible for this result is Belarus (2004), not Serbia (2000) or Georgia (2003), as diffusion scholars argue. The protests in Belarus were not successful and were repressed by the government. Moreover, many activists inside Belarus looked to the Orange Revolution in hopes of larger, successful protests spreading to Belarus, not the other way around. Similarly, the neighbor protest that coincides with the Georgia (2003) protests are the unsuccessful Azerbaijani (2003) protests, and not the successful Serbian (2000) protests. Inspection of other cases in the data do not find any activists alluding to protests in other neighboring countries although activists could be unaware of the subconscious effects that neighboring protests have on them.

**Table A15: Effect of Neighbor Protests (within 360 days) on Civil Liberties and Media Freedom, 1989-2011**

<i>DV: Civil Liberties</i>	50km Neighbors (153-158 countries; 2846-3302 obs.)			800km Neighbors (160-171 countries; 2968-3588 obs.)		
	<b>dummy</b>	<b>sum</b>	<b>size</b>	<b>dummy</b>	<b>sum</b>	<b>size</b>
<i>Country FEs</i>						
<i>Neighbor Democracy Protest</i> (last 360 days)	-0.002 (0.738)	-0.003 (0.504)	-0.006 (0.014)*	0.004 (0.377)	0.000 (0.985)	-0.003 (0.189)
<i>Country FEs + Controls</i>						
<i>Neighbor Democracy Protest</i> (last 360 days)	0.001 (0.758)	-0.001 (0.797)	-0.001 (0.734)	0.005 (0.142)	-0.000 (0.909)	0.001 (0.455)
<i>DV: Media Freedom</i>						
<i>Country FEs</i>						
<i>Neighbor Democracy Protest</i> (last 360 days)	0.001 (0.889)	-0.001 (0.821)	-0.004 (0.148)	0.005 (0.265)	0.001 (0.799)	-0.001 (0.441)
<i>Country FEs + Controls</i>						
<i>Neighbor Democracy Protest</i> (last 360 days)	0.003 (0.493)	0.001 (0.866)	0.001 (0.615)	0.006 (0.122)	0.000 (0.826)	0.002 (0.279)

*Note:* OLS regression estimates. The measures of Civil Liberties and Media Freedom come from V-Dem v8. **Political Civil Liberties Index (v2x\_clpol)** measures the extent to which political liberties are respected in a country. It is based on multiple indicators, including the harassment of journalists, freedom of discussion, whether opposition parties are autonomous, etc. It does not capture whether the country holds elections, either competitive or not. It ranges from 0 to 1, with larger values indicating higher respect for civil liberties. **Freedom of Expression Index (v2x\_freexp)** measures the extent to which the government respects media freedom as well as ordinary citizens' freedom to discuss political matters. It is based on multiple indicators, including the harassment of journalists, the extent to which the media is biased and/or self-censors itself, etc. It ranges from 0 to 1, with larger values indicating more freedom of expression. Effect of neighbor protests on Civil Liberties and Media Freedom (as measured by V-Dem) in neighboring countries within a 360-day time frame. Controls include population (logged), income per capita (logged), Cingranelli and Richards' physical integrity rights index, and the country's Polity score, all lagged one year. The *p*-values are based on standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. The unit of observation is the country-year. (\*) indicates significance at the 0.05 level.